CEO Power over the Board, Nontransient Investor Ownership, and Risk Taking --An Employment Security Perspective by Zhu, Qi (Author) et al.
CEO Power over the Board, Nontransient Investor Ownership, and Risk Taking  
--An Employment Security Perspective 
by 
Qi Zhu 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Business Administration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2019 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Wei Shen, Co-Chair 
David Zhu, Co-Chair 
Trevis Certo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
May 2019  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
Recognizing that CEOs are less capable of diversifying their employment risks 
than shareholders who could diversify their investment risks through portfolio 
investments, agency theory assumes that CEOs tend to be risk averse compared with 
shareholders. Based on this assumption, agency theory scholars suggest that to align the 
risk preference of CEOs with that of shareholders, CEOs need to be closely monitored 
and have less power. SEC regulators have been adopting the suggestion and accordingly 
CEO power has been reduced in the past decades. However, the empirical results are 
mixed and cannot provide solid support for the suggestion that reducing CEO power 
could lead the CEO to take more risks.  
Considering that managerial risk taking is an important issue in strategic 
management research and agency theory has been widely adopted in academia and 
business worlds, it is imperative to clarify the mechanism behind the relationship 
between CEO power and risk taking. My study aims to fill this research gap. In this study 
I follow agency theory to take an employment security perspective and fully consider 
how CEOs’ concern about employment security is affected by their power and ownership 
structure to enrich the understanding of the effects of CEO power and ownership 
structure on risk taking. I fine-tune the key concept CEO power into the CEO power over 
board and introduce a key aspect of ownership structure - nontransient investor 
ownership. I further suggest that CEO power over board and nontransient investor 
ownership affect CEOs’ employment security and the resulting CEO risk taking. In 
addition, I consider a set of industry and firm characteristics as the boundary conditions 
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for the effects of CEO power and nontransient investor ownership on CEO risk-taking. 
This set of industry and firm characteristics include industry complexity, industry 
dynamism, industry munificence and firm slack.  
I test my theory using a large-scale, multi-year sample of U.S. publicly listed S&P 
1500 firms between 2001 and 2017. My main hypotheses about the effects of CEO power 
over board and nontransient investor ownership on CEO risk taking receive strong 
support.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTON 
 
Managerial risk taking is a key concept in strategic management research (Pablo, 
Sitkin, and Jemison, 1996; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). It influences a broad spectrum of firm 
strategies, such as R&D spending (Barker and Mueller, 2002), capital investment 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005a, 2005b), competitive actions (Connelly, et al., 2010), 
diversification (Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, and Dalton, 2000), acquisitions and divestitures 
(Liu, Taffler, and John, 2009; Malmendier and Tate, 2008), etc. The agency theory, a 
prevailing perspective about governance, suggests that CEOs are risk averse compared 
with shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hoskisson, et al., 2017). Shareholders of 
a firm can diversify their risk through investing in a portfolio of companies and hence are 
assumed to be risk neutral. In contrast, CEOs cannot diversify their employment risk 
through working for multiple employers and thus are more risk-averse than shareholders 
are (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). How to increase the levels of risk that CEOs are 
willing to take is thus an important research question in the strategy field.  
Agency theory further incorporates the construct of power to address the issue of 
CEOs’ risk aversion. Power refers to the capacity of social actors to exert their will in a 
particular relationship (Pfeffer, 1981). Agency scholars have long suggested that CEOs 
should be closely monitored and regulated and thus have less power to exert their risk-
averse preference in firm strategies (e.g., Haynes and Hillman, 2010). As a result, these 
CEOs will be more likely to adopt strategies that are consistent with shareholders’ risk 
preferences to please shareholders and to secure their CEO positions. Agency scholars 
thus expect that CEOs with less power are more likely to take risks. However, the 
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negative relationship between CEO power and risk taking does not receive consistent 
support in empirical studies. While some research on shareholders has found support for 
the negative relationship (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Low, 2009; Shi et al., 2017), many studies 
examining CEO-board relationships have found the opposite (e.g., Baysinger et al., 1991; 
Lewellyn and Muller-Hahle, 2012). Considering that managerial risk-taking is an 
important issue in strategic management research (Pablo, Sitkin, and Jemison, 1996; 
Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) and that agency theory has been widely adopted in the academia 
and business worlds (Hoskisson et al., 2017), it is imperative to clarify the mechanism 
behind the relationship between CEO power and risk taking. My study aims to fill this 
research gap. 
I suggest that the agency theory explanation of how CEO power influences risk 
taking is problematic for two reasons. First, the agency theory logic only considers 
CEOs’ limited ability to diversify employment risk without considering their variant 
abilities to control their existing employment risk. While it is true that shareholders can 
better diversify their risks than CEOs, all CEOs face the same limitation in terms of 
diversifying employment risk. This suggests that it is especially important to consider 
CEOs’ different abilities to control the risk of their existing employment in understanding 
their different risk tendencies. My theory explains why greater CEO power over the 
board grants them greater control of existing employment and motivates CEOs to take 
greater risks. Second, agency theory assumes that shareholders have homogeneous risk 
preferences and tend to be more risk-seeking than CEOs in general. However, research 
on shareholders shows that different types of shareholders tend to exhibit different risk 
preferences. My study explains how non-transient investor ownership may protect CEOs 
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from the negative consequences of taking risky strategies, increasing CEO risk taking. 
Specifically, with the employment security granted by nontransient investors’ nonselling 
behaviors, CEOs will take more-risky strategies.  
Overall, taking an employment security perspective, my study examines how 
CEO power over board and nontransisent investor ownership affect CEO risk taking.  
I first argue that CEO power over board secures their positions in focal firms, 
lessening their concern about employment risk. In addition, powerful CEOs can be 
strongly motivated to adopt risky strategies because they can disproportionally benefit 
from the success of these strategies (Devers et al., 2007). Studies have long suggested 
that though risky strategies are tied to high failure hazards that can hurt CEOs’ 
employment security, they are also associated with high expected returns (Hoskisson et 
al., 2017; Low, 2009). Research shows that powerful CEOs often gain disproportionally 
from high firm performance, including enhanced personal wealth and status in business 
circles (Kang, 2016). To the extent that powerful CEOs can secure their positions when 
risky strategies fail and receive rewards when they succeed, I argue that CEOs’ power 
relative to the board increases CEO risk taking. Moreover, I argue that nontransient 
investor ownership also enhances CEO risk taking. My theory explains why nontransient 
investor ownership can protect CEOs from takeover threats and short-term performance 
pressure exerted by other investors, increasing CEOs’ employment security and hence 
their risk-taking tendency.  
In addition, I consider a set of industry and firm characteristics as the boundary 
conditions for the effects of CEO power over boards and nontransient investors on risk-
taking. This set of industry and firm characteristics, including industry complexity, 
  4 
industry dynamism, industry munificence and firm slack, moderate the effects of CEO 
power and nontransient investor ownership on CEOs’ employment security. The 
theoretical framework is shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I examine my theory by using large-scale longitudinal data on SandP 1500 firms 
from 2001 to 2017. The results provide strong support for my theory. This study makes 
several important contributions. First, I advance a novel employment security perspective 
to understand the effects of CEO power and nontransient investor ownership on risk 
Figure 1: Theoretical Model 
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taking. Extant research on corporate governance has largely assumed that CEOs are 
generally risk averse compared to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hoskisson, 
et al., 2017). My study explains why CEO power and nontransient investor ownership are 
major factors that influence CEOs’ risk-taking tendency through affecting their 
employment security. This in-depth analysis of CEOs’ employment security clarifies the 
mixed findings of the relationship between CEO power and risk taking in prior research. 
Second, my study contributes to the risk-taking literature by introducing a new 
antecedent of CEO risk taking - nontransient investor ownership. Prior research has given 
little attention to the relationship between ownership structure and CEO risk taking. My 
study proposes that nontransient investor ownership has a strong influence on CEOs’ 
control of their employment risk and thus affects the CEOs’ risk taking.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
CEO Power over Board  
Power refers to the capacity of social actors to exert their will in a particular 
relationship (Pfeffer, 1981). Many corporate governance studies that examine how to 
regulate the behaviors of CEOs to be consistent with the interests of shareholders have 
focused on the construct of CEO power and explored the outcomes of granting power to 
CEOs. 
In the 20th century, shareholders largely delegate the responsibilities of 
monitoring CEOs to boards of directors who represent the interests of shareholders. 
Accordingly, prior research has examined the construct of CEO power over boards of 
directors (Finkelstein, 1992). Boards of directors are granted the power of hiring and 
firing CEOs. Thus, once CEOs gain power over boards, CEOs could greatly enhance 
their levels of control of employment risk. Prior research suggests that CEOs could gain 
the power over boards through various channels. The seminal work on CEO power over 
boards indicates that CEO power is derived from structural power, prestige power, expert 
power and ownership power (Finkelstein, 1992). CEOs’ structural power over boards is 
derived from their firms’ formal organizational structures and hierarchical authorities 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Daily and Johnson, 1997). CEOs have more structural power over 
boards when they hold the board chair position, when the board is comprised of more 
independent directors who are appointed after CEO succession, and/or when board size is 
large (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Zhu and Chen, 2015). Prestige is another key source of 
CEO power. CEOs possess high prestige power when they graduate from elite 
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universities (D’Aveni, 1990; Finkelstein, 1992) and/or hold several directorships at other 
S&P1500 firms (e.g., Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Zhu and Chen, 2015). CEOs possess 
expert power when they have served in many functional areas (Finkelstein, 1992), have 
longer tenure in focal industries, and/or have longer tenure at focal firms (Zhang and 
Rajagopalan, 2003). That CEOs have expert power suggests that they have rich 
knowledge about functional areas, have more access to key resources or information 
outside firms, and/or have more firm-specific information (Finkelstein, 1992; Firstenberg 
and Malkiel, 1994).  
Nontransient Investor Ownership 
In recent decades, shareholders, particularly institutional investors, have become 
active in monitoring CEOs. In the following, I recount the history of institutional 
investors, three major types of institutional investors and their respective investment 
characteristics, and their effects on CEOs in portfolio firms.  
Institutional investors refers to the equity holders filed in 13-F Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) reports that manage more than $100 million of firm shares. 
Institutional investors have grown rapidly in recent decades, owning more than 50 
percent of all U.S. equities in 1992 and more than 80 percent in recent years (Gillan and 
Stark, 2007; Connelly et al., 2010). There are various kinds of institutional investors, 
including mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds (public, private, and corporate), 
banks, insurance companies, foundations, and endowments.  
Given the importance of institutional investors, scholars have focused on their 
investment strategies and behaviors. Researchers have found that various institutional 
investors have different investment and trading behaviors. Bushee (1998, 2004) 
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categorizes institutional investors into three groups based on the following two key 
dimensions: ownership stability and the size of the ownership stake. Transient 
institutional investors (hereafter, transient investors) are characterized by low ownership 
stability and small stake. These investors are rather sensitive to firms’ short-term 
performance but have little interest in firms’ long-term value. Dedicated institutional 
investors are investors with high ownership stability and a large stake. Their investment 
strategy is relationship-based investments, buying and holding large stakes in a small 
number of companies. Berkshire Hathaway is a good example. Historically (until 2001), 
this firm held 75% of its portfolio holdings for at least two years (Bushee, 2004). In each 
quarter of 2001, this firm sold less than 1% of its portfolio market value (Bushee, 2004). 
Others are quasi-indexer institutional investors. Bushee (2004) explained that these 
investors, similar to dedicated investors, also adopt buy-and-hold investment strategies. 
Comparatively, they invest in a broader set of companies than dedicated investors do and 
occasionally trade when there is a major change in their invested firms.  
Research on the relationship between institutional investors and corporate 
governance suggests that among the three types of institutional investors, nontransient 
institutional investors, including dedicated and quasi-indexer institutional investors, play 
the role of monitoring and regulating invested firms (Bushee, 1998; 2001; Connelly et al., 
2010; 2016). Transient institutional investors invest in several firms, hold small stakes for 
each firm, and hold them for a short period (Bushee, 2004). They capitalize on price 
fluctuations in volatile stock markets. This investment strategy indicates that they do not 
actively monitor and regulate their invested firms, including these firms’ top executives. 
Some scholars (e.g., Koh, 2007) also point out that these investors do not spend time and 
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resources on collecting detailed information to deeply understand the strategies and the 
value of the firms in which they have invested. Given their limited shares, neither are 
they able to regulate top executives through voting on the key strategies and governance 
decisions of each firm. Further, these transient investors have less incentive to monitor 
and regulate top executives because it often takes a rather long period of time for firms to 
gain value from better governance. However, transient investors are impatient, and thus 
could hardly benefit from monitoring and regulating top executives (Matsumoto, 2002; 
Schnatterly, Shaw, and Jennings, 2007).  
In contrast, nontransient institutional investors, including dedicated institutional 
investors and quasi-indexer institutional investors, serve as active and effective external 
governance of their invested firms (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Connelly et al., 2010). In 
particular, with the shareholder activism movement since the 1990s (Mizruchi and 
Marshall, 2016; Smith, 1996), these traditionally passive institutional investors have 
realized their potential capabilities and become active in closely monitoring their invested 
firms and the top executives as detailed below (Carleton et al., 1998; Koh, 2007; Smith, 
1996). 
These investors only invest in a limited number of firms and hold a large number 
of shares in each firm for a long period of time. To gain greater long-term value from this 
small number of firms with substantial stakes, they are motivated to develop close 
relationships with top executives to gain a deeper understanding of these firms’ 
strategies, operations, and real value (Bushee, 2004; David et al., 2010). They are also 
willing to spend resources on hiring experts to provide an independent and objective 
judgment of each firm’s strategies, operations and value (Schnatterly et al., 2008). 
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Collectively, they established Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and the Council of 
Institutional Investors to conduct comprehensive research on their portfolio firms (Gillan 
and Starks, 2007). Further, given the huge number of shares they hold in each firm, they 
are able to monitor and regulate top executives through their strong voting power. They 
further strengthen their voting power through collecting the voting rights scattered in 
their clients (Bogle, 2005). As a result, these patient investors will benefit greatly from 
tremendous value-adding strategies derived from better corporate governance 
(Matsumoto, 2002; Schnatterly, Shaw, and Jennings, 2007).  
 
In my study, nontransient investors, an important group of shareholders, refers to 
both quasi-indexer and dedicated institutional investors that collectively control 
approximately 70 percent of shares owned by all institutional investors (Shi, 2017). On 
the basis of prior research, nontransient investors with long-term orientation are less 
likely to sell their portfolio firm shares. Importantly, in firms with a larger portion of 
shares owned by these nontransient investors, their CEOs tend to be exposed to lower 
employment risk associated with takeovers. Accordingly, these CEOs tend to gain a 
higher level of control over their own employment risk and thus are more likely to 
undertake high-risk, high-return strategies.  
CEO Power and Risk Taking 
Regarding the outcomes of CEO power, a consensus is that CEO power helps 
CEOs to exert their preferences (Zhu and Chen, 2015), which may be at the expense of 
shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; 2005). As mentioned earlier, boards represent 
the interests of shareholders. Prior research has examined how CEO power affects the 
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monitoring and control of boards. Westphal and Zajac theorize that powerful CEOs tend 
to appoint new board members who are demographically similar to them and thus are 
sympathetic to them (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Thus, powerful CEOs could weaken the 
monitoring and control of their boards (Tuggle, Reutzel, and Bierman, 2008). CEOs 
maintain their power by selecting and retaining board members with experience on 
passive boards (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). Boeker (1992) also found that powerful 
CEOs could successfully attribute poor performance to other factors instead of 
themselves (Boeker, 1992; Shen and Cannella, 2002), and thus neutralize dismissal 
threats from boards when firms have poor performance. Further, powerful CEOs tend to 
increase their compensation, which may not be comparable with their input to their firms 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; 2005; Van Essen, Otten, and Carberry, 2015).  
In addition to personal benefits that the CEOs could receive through their gained 
power, prior research found that the power of CEOs has affected firm strategies. 
Powerful CEOs could inhibit the influence of boards on adopting strategic changes 
(Haynes and Hillman, 2010). In particular, scholars of corporate strategy have given 
much attention to the risks that powerful CEOs are willing to take. For instance, Zhu and 
Chen (2015) found that the power of CEOs increases risk taking by narcissistic CEOs. 
This attention toward CEO risk-taking is rooted in the strong assumption of 
agency theory that CEOs are risk averse compared to risk neutral shareholders. 
Compared to shareholders who could diversity their investment risk through portfolio 
investments (Hoskisson et al., 2017), CEOs are not able to diversify their employment 
risk through serving multiple firms. However, shareholders expect CEOs take the higher 
risks that are often associated with higher returns. On the basis of this assumption, agency 
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scholars have proposed to reduce the power of CEOs so that these CEOs will not be able 
to pursue low risk strategies but undertake higher risks to satisfy the boards and 
shareholders (Baysinger, et al., 1991; Shi, et al., 2017). However, empirical studies that 
examine the relationship between CEO power and risk taking have mixed findings. It is 
thus inconclusive regarding whether reduced CEO power would make CEOs undertake 
high-risk, high-return strategies (Baysinger, et al., 1991; Shi, et al., 2017).  
I argue that the mixed findings result from the confounded construct of CEO 
power. In this study, I fine-tune the CEO power into the CEO power over board and 
introduce the concept of nontransient investor ownership. Agency scholars have 
suggested that employment security given to CEOs plays an important role in regulating 
the behaviors of CEOs to be risk taking. I follow this logic to argue that the CEO power 
over board and nontransient investor ownership affect a CEO’s control of employment 
risk and thus the CEO’s risk-taking behavior.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Risky strategies are typically associated with high uncertainty but high expected 
returns (Hoskisson et al., 2017; Low, 2009). If fail, they can be attributed to CEOs’ lack 
of competence and thus threaten their employment security. Agency research thus 
suggests that CEOs who cannot diversify their employment risk through multiple jobs are 
not willing to take risks.  
In the following, I explain how CEO power over board and nontransient investor 
ownership influence CEOs’ employment risk and consequently their risk-taking behavior. 
Further, I propose four boundary conditions regarding the effects of CEO power and 
nontransient investor ownership on CEO risk taking.  
CEO Power over Board  
I argue that when CEOs hold more power over the board, these CEOs could avoid 
being dismissed by boards and thus better control their employment risk when risky 
strategies fail but benefit greatly when they succeed. The failures of risky investments 
often spark the concern of boards about the competencies of the CEOs who are 
responsible for the investments (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Martin and McConnell, 
1991). Subsequently, the boards often decide to dismiss these incompetent CEOs 
(Bandura and Jourden, 1991; Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2006). Therefore, CEOs who 
worry about their employment security are not willing to invest in risky strategies.  
In the following, I argue the power that CEOs have over board could help them 
reduce dismissal risk. On the one hand, CEOs gaining power over board often use their 
power to successfully attribute failures and poor performance to factors that are external, 
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unstable, and uncontrollable (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Clapham and Schwenk, 1991) 
and/or to other executives (Boeker, 1992) and thus avoid dismissal by their boards (Brady 
and Helmich, 1984; Boeker, 1992). On the other hand, boards often have greater 
confidence in powerful CEOs, such as those with prestige and expertise, and become less 
likely to dismiss these CEOs.  
Specifically, the attribution of firm performance is often an "ill-structured, 
complex problem" for the boards (Walsh, 1988: 873). It is very difficult for boards to 
identify factors that cause poor performance. Therefore, they attribute poor performance 
to the incapability of CEOs and dismiss these scapegoats, though they are willing to 
identify the complex reasons for poor performance (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Kerr and 
Kren. 1992). Under such circumstances, CEOs who have more power over board could 
exert their influence on boards and convince boards to attribute the failures of risky 
strategies to other uncontrollable factors instead of their own lack of capabilities.  
For instance, CEOs having structural power, including CEOs holding board chair 
positions and CEOs who appointed a large percentage of independent directors on their 
boards, are likely to be more able to convince boards to attribute the failures of risky 
strategies to other uncontrollable factors. Often, holding board chair positions enables 
these powerful CEOs to build strong and unambiguous leadership in firms, which inhibits 
the boards’ monitoring roles (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Shen and Cannella, 2002; 
Zhang, 2008). CEOs with chair positions also have strong influence on setting directors’ 
pay packages (O’Reilly and Main, 2010; Ungson and Steer, 1984), which further 
weakens the motivations of the directors to challenge CEOs. Moreover, when CEOs chair 
boards meetings, they control setting up the agenda and the communication of 
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information in meetings to meet their own interests (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Pearce 
and Zahra, 1991). Boards of directors often receive information, documents and voices 
that support CEOs’ opinions and decisions. When these CEOs attribute the failures of 
risky strategies to other factors instead of to their own leadership (Bettman and Weitz, 
1983; Boeker, 1992; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Shen, 2003; Gangloff, Connelly, and 
Shook, 2014), boards will be persuaded to be empathetic about these CEOs’ challenges in 
taking risks and accept these CEOs’ analyses of the failures as being caused by other 
uncontrollable factors. 
Research shows that CEOs who are at the top of the organizational hierarchy and 
thus often strong influencers on director nominations have a tendency to nominate 
directors compliant toward them (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Pollock et al., 2002; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Thus, even when CEOs do not hold board chair positions, 
CEOs could gain power over their boards when the boards have more independent 
directors nominated after the CEOs embark on CEO positions (Dalton et al., 1998). It is 
expected that the directors appointed after CEO successions tend to accept the 
attributions of the CEOs who grant them directorship. CEOs could further avoid 
dismissals when the board size is large. Large boards can hardly reach consensus or 
generate social cohesion. These boards often have serious internal communication and 
coordination issues (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Overall, weak boards often are less able 
to take actions to penalize these powerful CEOs through dismissals. 
 Furthermore, in addition to successfully attributing failures to other factors, 
powerful CEOs, particularly CEOs with prestige and expert power, offer boards strong 
confidence in their own judgments and capabilities. Powerful CEOs’ exclusive expertise 
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may even make the boards rely on their strong capabilities to enhance firm performance. 
Thus, the boards are less likely to dismiss these powerful CEOs. CEOs with high prestige 
are often seen as competent, credible and trustworthy (D’Aveni, 1990; Geis, 1977; 
Giordano, 1983). Research suggests that directors also believe prestigious CEOs have 
more “idiosyncrasy credits”. These credits can be exchanged for directors’ greater 
tolerances for CEOs’ mistakes and failures (Hollander, 1958). Directors believe that the 
CEOs need to simultaneously deal with many important issues that temporarily cause 
failures of challenging and risky strategies and that firm performance will eventually 
increase in the hands of prestigious CEOs.  
Prestigious CEOs are generally in the center of social elite networks with which 
directors are connected. The ties provide directors access to specific, historical and rich 
information about the CEOs and their strategies. The additional rich information can 
prevent directors from evaluating CEOs and their strategies purely based on firm 
financial performance indicators (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, and Hambrick, 2008). 
Directors trust that prestigious CEOs have rich external resources to contribute to 
enhance firm performance despite failures. Moreover, given fewer alternatives in 
executive labor markets and strong capabilities of the CEOs with rich resources, strong 
capabilities and expertise, boards of directors having a fiduciary duty toward shareholders 
are more likely to retain these powerful CEOs after failures of risky strategies 
(Fredrickson and Hambrick, 1988).  
 In the above, I theorize how CEO power helps to reduce dismissal threats through 
attributing failures to other factors and to build up boards’ confidence in them. In the 
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following, I will illustrate that CEO power could help to retain CEO compensation and 
status in business circles, which further makes their positions secure.  
  Failed risky strategies not only threaten CEOs’ employment security but also their 
compensation and status in business circles, which will eventually result in their 
dismissals. Agency research suggests that many CEOs’ compensations are closely 
aligned with their firm performance (Hoskisson et al., 2017). Therefore, failed risky 
strategies that result in huge losses to firms will cause significant reductions in CEOs’ 
compensations. However, finance research has suggested and found that when CEOs 
hold stronger power over their boards, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is weak (cf. 
Essen, Otten, and Carberry, 2015). As I argue earlier, powerful CEOs often gain support 
from their boards in attributing failures to other uncontrollable factors instead of their 
lack of capabilities, or they can build up their boards’ confidence in their capabilities. 
Thus, these CEOs can retain their levels of compensation even when their risky strategies 
fail. The retained number of compensation packages and powerful CEO social ties to 
directors can further help the CEOs maintain a reasonable reputation and sustain their 
status in business circles. As a result, powerful CEOs with fewer dismissal threats from 
boards and retained compensation and status become less hesitant in adopting risky 
strategies that may fail.  
Until now, I have argued how CEO power over boards could protect CEOs from 
dismissal threats as a result of failed risky strategies. I will continue to argue that CEO 
power could also help the CEO to gain tremendously from successful risky strategies.  
The successes of risky strategies often significantly increase firm performance 
(Hoskisson et al., 2017; Low, 2009). CEOs gaining power over boards often could more 
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easily take credit for great successes, attributing the successes to their strong capabilities 
in board meetings and through social ties with directors, accordingly benefiting 
extraordinarily from the successes (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Clapham and Schwenk, 
1991). For example, research has shown that CEOs taking board chair positions are able 
to take credit for successes by providing directors materials and information that 
completely support their strong capabilities such as their foresight and quality of 
management (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Salancik and Meindl, 1984). Directors who owe 
the CEOs who nominate them tend to agree with the CEOs that the successes are fully 
attributed to their strong capabilities. Moreover, as directors trust prestigious and expert 
CEOs’ capabilities and rich resources that are the key for firm success, boards are more 
likely to attribute successful risky investments to the CEOs. Accordingly, boards will 
award higher compensation to these CEOs who are viewed as shouldering full 
responsibility for risky strategies (Devers et al., 2007; Wade et al., 2006). Such 
compensation serves as a strong signal that significantly enhances these CEOs’ status in 
business circles (Kang, 2016). 
Overall, given that there are few threats to their employment security and 
tremendous benefits from successfully risky investments, CEOs who have more power 
over boards are strongly motivated to invest in risky strategies. Therefore, I hypothesize 
the following: 
H1: The greater a CEO’s power over the board, the riskier are the firm’s strategies.  
Nontransient Investor Ownership 
In addition to boards, shareholders represent another force that affects CEO 
employment security and risk taking but through a different mechanism. Boards are 
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endowed with the decision-making power to hire and fire CEOs. Shareholders could 
threaten CEO employment security through selling their portfolio firm shares and making 
these firms and CEOs become attractive targets with tumbling share prices in takeover 
markets (Billett and Xue, 2007). Studies have found that takeovers generally result in the 
turnover of acquired firms’ CEOs (Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004; Jensen, 1988). 
I argue that, compared with transient investors, nontransient investors - an 
important group of shareholders - often will not sell their shares in portfolio firms that are 
experiencing failures of risky strategies. Therefore, share prices of these firms remain 
stable, which distances these firms and CEOs from being takeover markets and grants 
CEOs higher levels of employment security. 
As discussed earlier, compared to transient investors, nontransient investors often 
spend a great amount of resources on acquiring deeper understanding of their portfolio 
firms’ strategies, operations, and real values, as well as constantly monitoring and 
regulating these firms’ strategies and behaviors with the ultimate purpose of gaining 
greater value from these firms in the long term. To create greater value in the long term, 
these patient investors know deeply that it is imperative for firms to adopt strategies that 
are often associated with risk. They are thus more likely to tolerate failures of risky 
strategies as long as these strategies are consistent with firms’ long-term value prospects 
(Koh, 2007). Further, compared to transient investors, these nontransient investors have 
better access to private firm information and thus will be able to make buy/sell decisions 
by taking into account other important nonfinancial factors as well, such as long-term 
strategies and the real value of firms (Schnatterly et al., 2008). As Bushee (2004) points 
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out, nontransient investors will sell their shares of portfolio firms only when the firms 
experience dramatic, value-destroying changes.  
Moreover, it is very difficult for these investors to sell their large volume of 
shares quickly without incurring high costs because there is not a sufficient number of 
buyers with strong purchasing power (Bushee, 1998; Connelly et al., 2010). Even if they 
may intend to sell a lot of firm shares, they cannot do so in practice (Bushee, 1998; 
Connelly et al., 2010). As a result, the share prices of firms experiencing failures of risky 
strategies and controlled by nontransient investors tend to be more stable, which makes 
the CEOs of these firms feel to be more secure.  
Additionally, as a result of their diligence work in regulating and interacting with 
the CEOs of their portfolio firms, compared to transient investors, nontransient investors 
are more likely to vote down incapable CEOs and vote strong confidence in the 
remaining CEOs of their portfolio firms. Compared to transient investors, these 
nontransient investors are less likely to rate the CEOs they vote for as unqualified and/or 
incapable based only on short-term firm financial performance and failures of risky 
strategies. In contrast, they appreciate that these CEOs are willing to take risky strategies 
that may fail but will add great value to firms in the long term. Compared to the transient 
investors, these nontransient investors are likely to attribute failures of risky strategies to 
other factors instead of a lack of capabilities of the CEOs who initiate the risky strategies. 
Accordingly, nontransient investors could also help the CEOs to reduce their employment 
risk through convincing the boards that they are capable and that failures are attributable 
to other factors uncontrollable by the CEOs. Scholars have long recognized that, 
compared to the transient investors, these nontransient investors have close interactions 
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with boards in and outside of boardrooms (Bushee, 2004). As a result, these CEOs’ 
reputation and status as capable executives are sustained, which is embodied in their 
continued compensation packages. Therefore, despite the failures of risky strategies, the 
CEOs of firms controlled by nontransient investors often have entrenched positions in 
their firms and sustained wealth and status in business circles; therefore, they will not 
hesitate to adopt risky strategies.  
These powerful, nontransient investors who control firms and monitor CEOs and 
top executives typically count on capable CEOs to create great value for firms in the long 
term. Thus, the nontransient investors often greatly appreciate the CEOs’ initiatives of 
risky strategies and attribute the successes of risky strategies to the capabilities of these 
CEOs. Accordingly, the CEOs of the firms controlled by nontransient investors often 
receive greater benefits from the successes of their risky strategies than do the CEOs of 
the firms controlled by transient investors. Nontransient investors are more likely to 
approve their updated compensation packages to motivate them to create more value, to 
sustain their positions in shareholder meetings and to appreciate their bold investments 
and successes officially and socially. Therefore, the CEOs of the firms controlled by 
powerful nontransient investors are motivated more to take higher risks than are the 
CEOs of the firms controlled by transient investors. Therefore, I hypothesize the 
following: 
H2: The higher the level of nontransient investor ownership, the riskier the firm’s 
strategies. 
One key mechanism that I develop earlier is the role of CEO power in 
performance attributions and employment security that in turn affect the risk taking of the 
  22 
CEO. Specifically, CEO power over board and nontransient investor ownership affect 
whether boards and investors attribute failures of risky strategies to other factors 
uncontrolled by the CEO instead of to the CEO and attribute the successes of risky 
strategies to the CEO’s capabilities. Subsequently, when a CEO with high levels of 
control of employment risk can ensure that the failures of risky strategies are attributed to 
other factors, the CEO becomes less hesitant to take higher risks; when the CEO is 
considered the key to the successes of risky strategies, the CEO will be further strongly 
motivated to take higher risks.  
Moreover, I propose that there are theoretical boundaries for these baseline 
hypotheses. On the one hand, I suggest that a set of moderators including industry 
complexity and industry dynamism could moderate the relationship between CEO power 
and nontransient investor ownership and risk taking through their effects on performance 
attributions to CEOs. For example, industry complexity may make it easier for a 
powerful CEO to attribute good performance to his/her strategy while attributing poor 
performance to other factors. On the other hand, I posit that another set of moderators 
including industry munificence, firm slack and the ratio of CEO equity-based pay could 
moderate the baseline hypotheses through their effects on managerial discretion. Prior 
research on managerial discretion has long suggested that CEOs do not always have 
complete “latitude of action” (Lieberson and O’Connor, 1972; Hannan and Freeman, 
1977). Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) further suggest that the preferences of top 
executives become less important and environmental and organizational factors could be 
more significant in influencing firms’ strategies (Shen and Cho, 2005). For example, low 
discretion caused by low munificence or lack of slack resources may weaken the positive 
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effect of CEO power on risk taking because they provide CEOs fewer strategic options to 
choose from. Overall, I propose four moderators that will strengthen or weaken the 
relationship between CEO power and nontransient investor ownership and risk taking 
through their influence on performance attributions to CEOs or managerial discretion. 
These four moderators include industry complexity, industry dynamism, industry 
munificence and firm slack.  
Moderator – Industry Complexity  
Industry complexity refers to the heterogeneity and range of the activities in an 
industry (Dess and Beard, 1984). Industry complexity suggests that a great number of 
factors that are interweaved with each other sophisticatedly affect firms in such an 
industry (Aldrich, 1979; Dess and Beard, 1984; Keats and Hitt, 1988). Industry 
complexity increases when industry concentration decreases (Keats and Hitt, 1988) and 
more competitors are involved (Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). When the number of 
competitors increases, the potential interconnectedness among competitors could increase 
and become sophisticated (Chen, 1996; Grimm, Lee, and Smith, 2006).  
I argue earlier that CEOs’ power over their boards increases CEOs’ risk-taking 
tendency by reducing the CEOs’ employment risk when risky strategies fail and 
increasing the CEOs’ benefits when risky strategies succeed. I further suggest that while 
CEOs’ power over their boards increases CEOs’ risk-taking tendency by reducing the 
CEOs’ employment risk and increasing the benefits that the CEOs could acquire, such 
effects are stronger when an industry is high in complexity.  
In complex industries, there are a great number of competitors, competitive 
activities, and other elements that are interconnected with each other, and the cause-effect 
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relationship is ambiguous (Milliken, 1987). In complex industries, competitive rules and 
norms have not been institutionalized (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Therefore, it is 
much more difficult for boards to evaluate whether failures are caused by CEOs’ lack of 
capabilities. Therefore, CEOs with more power over boards could better use their power 
to attribute failures to the complex competitive landscape in those industries where 
failures are not unusual (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Boeker, 1992; Salancik and Meindl, 
1984; Shen, 2003; Gangloff, Connelly, and Shook, 2014). The boards in these industries 
have also developed understanding of the competitive landscape, having empathy with 
the CEOs regarding the complex factors affecting competitive activities with failures and 
successes. 
Moreover, in complex industries, boards will count more on powerful CEOs with 
prestige and expertise to turn around the firms after failures. These powerful CEOs, who 
often have been serving for a long period in these industries, have accumulated valuable 
intangible experience, expertise and social capital with respect to how to succeed in such 
complex industries. It is not easy for boards to hire others to replace these powerful 
CEOs. The effects of CEO power are clearly stronger in these complex industries.  
In contrast, in industries with low complexity, CEOs are less able to use their 
power to attribute their failures to other factors because means-ends relationships of 
strategies are more evident in these industries (Dess and Beard, 1984; Keats and Hitt, 
1988), of which the boards are knowledgeable. Therefore, the effect of CEO power over 
boards on their ability to attribute failures to others and reduce his/her own dismissal 
hazards is likely to be weaker when industries are low in complexity.  
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In a similar logic, CEOs in complex industries where competitive activities are 
continuous and means-ends relationships of strategies are ambiguous (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987; Tang and Li, 2010) can better use their power to attribute successes to 
themselves and thus be more able to take credit for the successes of risky strategies 
(Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Boeker, 1992; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Shen, 2003; 
Gangloff, Connelly, and Shook, 2014). However, in industries with low complexity, 
where means-ends relationships of strategies are evident, CEOs are less able to utilize 
their power to attribute successes to themselves and less able to take extra credit for the 
successes. Therefore, I argue that the relationship between CEO power over boards and 
CEO risk taking is stronger in complex industries. 
H3a: The higher an industry’s complexity, the stronger is the positive effect of the CEO’s 
power over the board on the firm’s level of strategic risk.  
I argue earlier that when there is a high level of nontransient investor ownership, 
the CEO is more likely to take risks. The primary mechanism is that nontransient 
investors controlling a large number of shares often do not sell these firm shares in cases 
of failures of risky strategies, which stabilizes share price and protects firms and CEOs 
from that takeover markets that target firms with tumbling share prices.  
I further argue that while nontransient investor ownership enhances CEOs’ risk-
taking tendency by increasing the CEOs’ employment security, such an effect is weaker 
in industries high in complexity.  
The ownership of nontransient investors becomes less likely to secure CEOs’ 
employment positions in a complex industry, where these nontransient investors become 
more likely to sell firm shares after failed risky strategies. Because industry complexity 
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implies that the means-ends relationships of firm strategies are not evident (Hambrick 
and Finkelstein, 1987; Li and Tang, 2010), nontransient investors become less able to 
evaluate whether CEOs are capable of adopting risky strategies to increase firms’ long-
term benefits in such a complex environment. In such circumstances, failures of strategies 
will serve a signal to nontransient investors that the CEO may be incapable. As a result, 
nontransient investors with less confidence in the CEO are more likely to attribute the 
failures of risky strategies to the CEO’s lack of capabilities and sell firm shares to escape 
from such a firm with an incapable CEO. Furthermore, industry complexity indicates that 
there are a tremendous number of firms operating in the same industry (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987). Firms in the same industry often share industrial similarities and 
appeals to investors. Therefore, nontransient investors in this industry could quickly sell 
their firm shares at low cost in this industry with a sufficient number of buyers. 
In contrast, in an industry with less complexity, it is much easier for nontransient 
investors to evaluate whether CEOs are capable of adopting risky strategies to benefit 
firms in the long term (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Li and Tang, 2010). In fact, their 
long-term investments in firms have already voted for the CEOs of the firms. 
Nontransient investors become less likely to attribute failures of risky strategies to CEOs 
and to sell firm shares, because they are confident in and rely on these CEOs’ capabilities 
to turn around firms (Connelly et al., 2016). Further, the number of potential buyers in 
this industry is very limited. It is much more difficult for the nontransient investors to sell 
their shares quickly and with less cost. As a result, nontransient investor ownership could 
better secure these CEOs’ positions by not selling firm shares in cases of failures of risky 
strategies in the industry lower in complexity. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
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H3b: The higher an industry’s complexity, the weaker is the positive effect of the 
nontransient investor ownership on the firm’s level of strategic risk.  
Moderator – Industry Dynamism  
Industry dynamism defines the extent to which the industry is unpredictable and 
unstable (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995). An industry 
with a high level of dynamism means that either this industry is competitively unstable 
(Grimm et al., 2006) or the constituents that affect firms operating in this industry are 
unpredictable (Ferrier, 2001). While industry complexity captures existing complex and 
ambiguous industry environments, industry dynamism focuses on the unpredictability of 
the probability and nature of the changes of competitive activities, regulations and other 
components in an industry (Milliken, 1987; George 2005). 
I argue earlier that CEOs’ power over their boards increases CEOs’ risk-taking 
tendency by reducing the CEOs’ employment risk when risky strategies fail and 
increasing the CEOs’ benefits when risky strategies succeed. I further suggest that such 
effects are stronger when an industry is more dynamic.  
When an industry is more dynamic, noncontrollable factors or luck may explain 
more about failures and successes, particularly for risky strategies. In such dynamic 
industries, it becomes more important for CEOs to gain power over boards. Thus, these 
CEOs, such as CEOs chairing board meetings, could use their power to provide rich 
information and evidence to attribute failures to noncontrollable unforeseeable factors 
that exert stronger influences than they themselves do (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Boeker, 
1992; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Shen, 2003; Gangloff, Connelly, and Shook, 2014). In 
such dynamic industries, it is indeed very difficult for CEOs to formulate strategies in 
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advance. Even when CEOs have formulated strategies, the implementation is very 
challenging due to unpredictable factors that could hamper the implementation of the 
strategies in such dynamic industries. The explanations of the CEO will be accepted by a 
weak board not willing or able to challenge the CEO and who will be persuaded by the 
analyses of a powerful CEO with knowledge of this industry’s characteristics. In contrast, 
when an industry is low in dynamism, competitors’ behaviors are more predictable; 
boards can better evaluate CEO performance. It is very difficult for a powerful CEO to 
identify other factors to which their failures can be attributed. The blame by the CEO on 
other factors is less acceptable to the board. Therefore, the effect of a CEO with power 
over boards to attribute failures to others and to reduce his/her own dismissal hazards 
could be stronger when an industry is high in dynamism than when an industry is low in 
dynamism. 
In a similar logic, CEOs in a dynamic industry where the probability and nature of 
changes are less predictable could better use their power to attribute successes to 
themselves and thus be more able to take credit for the successes of risky strategies. 
CEOs in these dynamic industries often need to react to unpredicted competitive actions 
and make constant efforts to adapt to on-going changes (Ferrier, 2001). However, given 
limited time invested in firms, boards in these industries are often not fully aware of the 
efforts and contributions of CEOs (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Mace, 1971). Hence, it is 
more critical for CEOs to gain power over board to fully demonstrate their credit in 
successful risky strategies. However, in an industry with low dynamism where the nature 
and timing of changes and the nature and severity of the impact of changes are 
predictable (Filliken, 1987), CEO are less able to utilize their power to attribute successes 
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to themselves and less able to take extra credit for successes. Therefore, I argue that the 
relationship between CEO power over boards and CEO risk taking is stronger in an 
industry with high dynamism.  
H4a: The higher an industry’s dynamism, the stronger is the positive effect of the CEO’s 
power over the board on the firm’s level of strategic risk.  
I argue earlier that when firms are largely owned by nontransient investors who 
are less likely to sell firm shares and offer CEOs employment security, these CEOs are 
more likely to take risks. I further suggest that such effects are weaker in an industry high 
in dynamism. 
Nontransient investor ownership becomes less able to secure CEOs’ employment 
positions in a dynamic industry where these nontransient investors become more likely to 
sell firm shares after failed risky strategies. To survive and sustain a competitive 
advantage in a dynamic industry, nontransient investors often expect that firms need to 
have dynamic capabilities to continuously surf and succeed in industry dynamism in the 
long term. Hence, once firms fail in risky strategies, long-term oriented nontransient 
investors will start to have doubts in these firms’ dynamic capabilities to survive and gain 
profits in this industry. Firms’ sustained competitive advantage in this industry heavily 
depends on firms’ series of temporary competitive advantages resulted from a variety of 
continuously successful risky strategies (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Li and Tang, 
2010). With shaken confidence in these firms and their CEOs, nontransient investors are 
more likely to attribute failures of strategies to CEOs and sell firm shares after failed 
strategies. Furthermore, industry dynamism suggests that there are many competitors in 
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the industry (Hoskisson et al., 2017). Therefore, nontransient investors in this industry 
with several potential buyers could quickly sell their firm shares at low cost. 
In contrast, in an industry with less dynamism, it is much easier for nontransient 
investors to evaluate whether CEOs are capable of succeeding in risky strategies that will 
benefit firms in the long term. Nontransient investors’ investments in firms have already 
voted for the CEOs of these firms (Bushee, 1998; Connelly et al., 2010). Therefore, with 
strong confidence in these CEOs, nontransient investors become less likely to attribute 
failures of risky strategies to CEOs and to sell firm shares after these CEOs’ failures in 
risky strategies. Further, the number of potential buyers in this industry is stabilized and 
very limited. It is much more difficult for the nontransient investors to sell their shares 
quickly and at less cost (Bushee, 1998; Connelly et al., 2010). As a result, nontransient 
investor ownership could better secure these CEOs’ positions by not selling firm shares 
in cases of failures of risky strategies. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
H4b: The higher an industry’s dynamism, the weaker is the positive effect of nontransient 
investor ownership on the firm’s level of strategic risk.  
Moderator - Industry Munificence  
Industry munificence captures an industry’s ability to support sustained growth 
(Dess and Beard, 1984; Keats and Hitt, 1988). Firms in a munificent industry could 
access more opportunities and resources (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987).  
I argue earlier that CEOs’ power over their boards increases CEOs’ risk-taking 
tendency by reducing the CEOs’ employment risk when risky strategies fail and 
increasing the CEOs’ benefits when risky strategies succeed. Here, I argue that this 
relationship can be strengthened when firms operate in a munificent industry. CEOs in an 
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industry high in munificence have a greater number of opportunities to explore in the 
market (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). Thus, 
powerful CEOs have more discretion to explore risky strategies.  
Further, given the number of investment opportunities and discretion, failures of 
investments in munificent industries are less consequential to CEOs. CEOs in less 
munificent industries with limited investment opportunities and discretion often have 
fewer chances to turn around from failures. Thus, these CEOs are likely to encounter 
threats of being taken over, though the CEOs gaining power over board will not be laid 
off by their boards after failures. Comparatively, CEOs in munificent industries could 
continue exploring other rich investments to enhance firm investment returns. Therefore, 
compared to CEOs operating in less munificent industries, powerful CEOs operating in 
munificent industries are likely to utilize their power to take more risks.  
Moreover, powerful CEOs with the incentives of greater benefits from successful 
risky strategies are motivated to utilize their expanded discretion to take risks and explore 
richer opportunities in such a munificent environment. However, CEOs operating in a 
less munificent industry with very limited opportunities tend to have less discretion and 
thus are likely to adopt fewer risky strategies. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
H5a: The higher an industry’s munificence, the stronger is the positive effect of the 
CEO’s power over the board on the firm’s level of strategic risk.  
As I argue earlier, when there is a high level of nontransient investor ownership, 
the CEO is more likely to take risks. The key mechanism is that powerful nontransient 
investors often do not sell their large number of firm shares in cases of failures of risky 
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strategies, which stabilizes firm share price and protects firms and CEOs from being 
targets in takeover markets.  
I further argue that nontransient ownership enhances CEOs’ risk-taking tendency by 
increasing the CEOs’ employment risk, and such effects are stronger in a munificent 
industry.  
As argued earlier, CEOs with the employment security granted by nontransient 
investors are motivated to take risks. As munificent industries offer CEOs richer 
opportunities and broader discretion to explore, the CEOs are likely to adopt more-risky 
strategies in these industries (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; George, 2005; Nohria and 
Gulati, 1996). The CEOs do not worry about the failure of risky strategies because 
nontransient investors often will be less likely to sell their shares after failures, given the 
richer opportunities provided by munificent industries. However, the CEOs have greater 
chances of success in munificent industries that offer tremendous opportunities, and they 
could benefit greatly from successful risky strategies, as nontransient investors who rely 
on them for better performance tend to reward their good performance. However, while 
CEOs with firms owned by nontransient investors are motivated to take risks as I argue 
earlier, these CEOs may however have less discretion in a low-munificence industry that 
offers fewer opportunities and thus are likely to adopt fewer risky strategies. Therefore, I 
hypothesize the following: 
H5b: The higher an industry’s munificence, the stronger is the positive effect of 
nontransient investor ownership on the firm’s level of strategic risk.  
Moderator - Firm Slack 
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Firm slack refers to extra resources that firms are not utilizing and could access. 
Prior research suggests there are three key slacks: available slack, recoverable slack, and 
potential slack (Chen, 2007; 2008). Available slack consists of resources that are not yet 
assimilated into the technical design of the organization. Recoverable slack consists of 
resources that have already been absorbed into the system design but may be recovered in 
adverse times. Potential slack consists of the capacity of the organization to generate 
extra resources from the environment, as by raising additional debt or equity capital.  
I argue earlier that CEOs’ power over their boards increases CEOs’ risk-taking 
tendency by reducing the CEOs’ employment risk when risky strategies fail and 
increasing the CEOs’ benefits when risky strategies succeed. I further suggest that such 
effects are stronger when a firm has more slack resources.  
Compared with CEOs constrained by firm resources, slack resources give 
powerful CEOs more discretion to invest in risky strategies (Shen and Cho, 2005). 
Further, on the one hand, powerful CEOs could still hold their positions after failures of 
risky strategies. On the other hand, powerful CEOs have more chances to succeed given 
the expanded discretion and richer investment opportunities provided by slack resources 
and thus could gain greatly from these successes (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; 
George, 2005; Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Thus, compared with CEOs constrained by 
resources, powerful CEOs with slack resources are motivated to utilize such slack 
resources and have the discretion to invest in more-risky strategies. The effects of CEO 
power on risk taking are strengthened in firms with richer slack resources. However, 
while powerful CEOs are motivated to take risks as I argue earlier, constrained resources 
limit CEOs’ discretion in exploring risky strategies. The effects of CEO power on risk 
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taking are weakened in firms with fewer slack resources. Therefore, I hypothesize the 
following: 
H6a: The richer a firm’s slack resources, the stronger is the positive effect of the CEO’s 
power over the board on the firm’s level of strategic risk.  
As I argue earlier, nontransient investors often do not sell their large number of 
firm shares in cases of failures of risky strategies, which stabilizes firm share price and 
protects firms and CEOs from being targets in takeover markets. Thus, when the level of 
nontransient investor ownership is higher, the CEO is more likely to take risks.  
I further argue that while nontransient investor ownership enhances CEOs’ risk-
taking tendency by increasing the CEOs’ employment risk, such effects are stronger in a 
firm with more slack resources. In firms with rich slack resources and nontransient 
investors, less powerful CEOs not only have more discretion to take risky strategies but 
also have stronger motivations to do so. Exploiting their expanded discretion through 
more-risky investments, these CEOs could still hold their positions despite the failures of 
risky strategies, as nontransient investors often do not sell shares after failures but count 
on them to effectively utilize slack resources and discretion to enhance firm performance. 
Given the expanded discretion and a greater number of investment opportunities offered 
due to slack, the CEOs will have more chances to succeed and enjoy greatly the successes 
that will be rewarded by the nontransient investors. However, while CEOs affiliated with 
firms owned by nontransient investors are motivated to take risks as I argue earlier, these 
CEOs have less discretion in firms with limited slack resources and thus are likely to 
adopt fewer risky strategies. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
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H6b: The richer a firm’s slack resources, the stronger is the positive effect of 
nontransient investor ownership on the firm’s level of strategic risk.  
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
Sampling 
My initial sample includes all the CEOs of S&P1500 firms. The S&P1500 Index 
includes the Large-Cap 500 Index (covering firms with a market capitalization of at least 
$4 billion), the Mid-Cap 400 Index (covering firms with a market capitalization between 
$1 billion and $4 billion), and the Small-Cap 600 Index (covering firms with a market 
capitalization between $300 million and $1 billion). Thus, the S&P 1500 Index covers 
approximately 85% to 90% of the U.S. equity market capitalization, being a broad market 
portfolio (Standard and Poor’s, 2010). The sample starts from the year 2001, when the 
BoardEx Database began to provide the information on the top management teams of 
S&P1500 firms, and ends in the year 2017 (inclusive). Compared with prior research 
related to CEO power that focused primarily on large firms (e.g., Haynes and Hillman, 
2010), my study has a more representative sample of U.S. firms by including firms with 
medium and small market capitalizations.  
I gathered my data from multiple sources. The primary source for CEO and 
director data is the BoardEx Database. BoardEx provides key information about CEOs, 
directors, and other top managers, such as their compensation and employment records, 
etc. I further summarized directors’ information into the board level and developed my 
measurements about boards. Further, I collected the information about firms’ institutional 
investors from the Thomason-Reuters database. I retrieved firm and industry financial 
information from the COMPUSTAT North America Dataset and COMPUSTAT 
Historical Segments Dataset. I collected firms’ merger and acquisition information from 
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SDC platinum. Finally, I obtained patent information from USPTO and combined patent 
information with other databases using the matching table provided by Kogan et al. 
(2016). 
Dependent Variable 
Consistent with prior research, I captured CEO risk taking by aggregating four 
major measurements which were typically associated with uncertain returns: capital 
expenditure, R&D spending, long-term debt, and acquisition expenditure of firms 
(Campbell et al., 2019; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011; Devers, McMara, Wiseman, and 
Arrfelt, 2008; Martin, Gomz-Mejia, and Wiseman, 2013; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007). I 
collected capital expenditures, R&D spending, and long-term debt from the Compustat 
database. I further captured acquisitions as the total transaction value of all acquisitions 
completed by a firm and reported in SDC platinum. I aggregated these risk-taking 
indicators rather than treating them as separate dependent variables because these 
spending categories often substitute for each other. For example, a firm may expand its 
product portfolio through an acquisition instead of through R&D investments (Campbell 
et al., 2019). I formed a risk-taking index by logging the sum of the four different types 
of risky spending to create an aggregate indicator (Campbell et al., 2019; Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, 2011). 
Independent Variables 
CEO power over board is measured as the sum of the standard score of the three 
dimensions of power: structural power, prestige power, and expert power (Finkelstein, 
1992). First, following prior studies, I added the standard scores of the three indicators of 
CEO structural power into a single index of CEO structural power (e.g., Zhu and Chen, 
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2015). The three indicators include CEO duality, board size, and the ratio of directors 
appointed after CEO succession. I coded CEO duality as one when CEOs serve as board 
chairmen, otherwise zero. I measured board size as the number of directors on boards. 
The ratio of directors appointed after CEO succession refers to the percentage of outside 
directors appointed during the CEOs’ tenure (e.g., Pollock, Fischer, and Wade, 2002).  
Second, I standardized and added the three indicators of CEO prestige to measure 
CEOs’ prestige power. These three indicators include a CEO’s highest degree obtained, 
whether a CEO received education from an elite school, and CEOs’ total number of 
directorships. I used a categorical variable to measure CEOs’ education degree. I divided 
the education degree into four categories; less than a bachelor’s degree, a bachelor’s 
degree, a master’s degree, and a doctoral degree (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Education 
degree took the value of 0 for less than bachelor degree, 1 for bachelor degree, 2 for 
master’s degree, etc. Next, I identified whether CEOs have attended the elite educational 
institutions listed by Finkelstein (1992). This variable was coded as 1 when CEOs are in 
the group, and 0 otherwise. I measured CEOs’ total number of directorships as the 
number of directorships that CEOs hold at other S&P1500 firms. 
Third, I capture CEOs’ expert power by using the sum of the standard score of the 
three indicators including the number of functional areas CEOs served previously 
(Finkelstein, 1992), CEOs’ industry tenure, and CEOs’ focal firm tenure (Zhang and 
Rajagopalan, 2003). Following prior studies (e.g., Chaganti and Sambharya, 1987; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Miles and Snow, 1978; Istphal and Zajac, 1995), I counted 
the number of functional areas that CEOs served previously. The three key areas include 
output functions (marketing and sales), throughput functions (operations, R&D, and 
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engineering) and peripheral functions (law, finance, and accounting). I measured CEOs’ 
industry tenure as the number of years that the CEOs have served in the industries (Zhang 
and Rajagopalan, 2004). I captured CEOs’ tenure at focal firms using the number of years 
that the CEOs have served at the focal firms.  
Nontransient investor ownership is captured as the percentage of shares owned 
by nontransient institutional investors. I followed Bushee (1998; 2001) to identify 
dedicated institutional investors among all the institutional investors reported in Thomson 
Reuter Institutional Holdings (13F). This approach classifies institutional investors into 
different types based on three factors: portfolio turnover, momentum trading strategies, 
and portfolio diversification strategies (Bushee, 2001). Institutions are then classified into 
groups using k means cluster analysis on the basis of their factor scores (Bushee, 2001; 
Bushee and Noe, 2000). Nontransient investors are low on all three factors as a result of 
factor analysis. Once recognizing the nontransient investors in each sample firm, I further 
calculated the average of these nontransient investors’ holdings across four quarters for 
each year.  
Some studies measured CEO power by using CEO ownership (Haynes and 
Hillman, 2010). However, I argue that CEO ownership could simultaneously represent 
CEO power over board and nontransient investor ownership. Thus, I did not include CEO 
ownership into either the measure of CEO power over board or nontransient investor 
ownership. However, I included it as a control variable, as shown below. 
Moderators 
I included five variables as moderators: industry munificence, industry 
complexity, industry dynamism, firm slack, and CEO equity-based pay.  
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Following prior studies (Dess, Ireland, and Hitt, 1990; McNamara, Haleblian, 
Dykes, 2008; Sutcliffe, 1994), industry munificence is measured as the coefficient of 
regression of log-transformed industry sales on a categorical year variable using data over 
the prior five years. Industry complexity captures the sales concentration and was 
calculated using Herfindahl's index of homogeneity, measured as one minus the sum of 
the squared market shares of publicly traded firms in an industry (George, 2005). 
Industry dynamism is calculated as the standard deviation of sales growth at the industry 
level over the previous five years. 
Following prior research (Bourgeois 1981; Bromiley 1991; Marino and Lange 
1983; Palmer and Wiseman 1999; Singh 1986), I measured firm slack using accounting 
data. Firm slack is composed of three components: available slack, recoverable slack, and 
potential slack (Bourgeois and Sigh, 1983; Chen, 2008; Singh, 1983). To measure 
available slack, I divided current assets by current liabilities (Chen, 2008). The result is 
current ratio, which measures the liquid resources uncommitted to liabilities and 
represents available slack. Recovery slack is represented by working capital-to-sales 
ratio, which captures absorption of slack related to capital utilization (Chen, 2008). I 
further measured potential slack using equity-to-debt ratio, which reflects the ability to 
borrow further (Chen, 2008). I standardized these three measurements and summed them 
to obtain a general slack index to measure firm slack (Chen, 2008).  
Control Variables 
I included a set of variables in my models to control for industry-, firm-, board-, 
and CEO-level characteristics that could affect the extent to which a CEO adopts risky 
strategies.  
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(1) I added several firm-level controls in my empirical models. First, I included firm size, 
measured as the log-transformed number of employees (Campbell et al., 2019) and 
diversification, measured as the entropy index (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel, 
1993). Prior research (Eisenmann, 2002; Li and Tang, 2010; Kang, Kang, Kim, 2017) 
found that large, old, and/or highly diversified firms have strong inertia, which reduces 
managerial discretion and prevent CEOs from adopting risky strategies. Second, I 
controlled for two different forms of firm performance: return on assets (net income over 
total assets) and Tobin’s Q (the ratio of market to book value) because prior performance 
may influence a CEO's perception of the gain/loss situation, which in turn will influence 
CEOs’ risk taking (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
Third, I included financial leverage (measured as a ratio of total liabilities to total 
sales) since a higher level of debt lowers a firm's borrowing capacity to take risks 
(Bourgeois, 1981; Singh, 1986). Fourth, I included stock market beta (e.g., Bromiley, 
Rau, and Zhang, 2017), which captured the turbulence of a firm’s share price related to 
the whole stock market (Compbell et al., 2019). CEOs tend to adopt less risky strategies 
when their firms’ share price experiences huge turbulence, reducing the possibility of 
being acquired. Fifth, I included a lagged value of the dependent variable (CEO risk 
takingt), as firms’ strategies could be influenced by the previous year’s strategies 
(Campbell et al., 2019; Kish-Gephard and Campbell, 2015).  
Sixth, I included transient owners, which captured the percentage of shares 
owned by transient owners over total shares outstanding (Shi et al., 2017). Prior research 
suggested that transient owners are more likely to sell off firm shares when firms 
experience poor performance (Bushee, 1998; 2001). Thus, CEOs are less likely to adopt 
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risky strategies when more shares are owned by transient owners. Similar to the processes 
of identifying dedicated institutional investors, the transient owners are the investors that 
are high on portfolio turnover, momentum trading strategies, and portfolio diversification 
strategies (Bushee, 2001). I do not control for non-institutional investors because this 
value is highly correlated with the independent variable CEO power over nontransient 
institutional investors.  
(2) My empirical models also included a few board- and CEO-level variables. 
First, I controlled for presence of female director (binary indicator that takes the value of 
1 if at least one woman sits on the board) because firms with female directors are likely 
to take more-risky strategies (e.g., Campbell et al., 2019; Post and Byron, 2015).  
Second, studies found that young CEOs (Devers et al., 2008; Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984; Serfling, 2014) and founder CEOs (Begley, 1995) are associated with 
more-risky strategies. I thus included the variables including CEO age and founder CEO. 
Third, CEO age was measured as subtracting from the current year the CEOs’ birth year. 
Fourth, founder CEOs were labeled as 1 if CEOs are the founder CEOs, and 0 otherwise.  
Fifth, I controlled for CEO ownership. I capture this construct using the ratio of 
shares owned by CEOs over net number of firms’ total shares (Finkelstein, 1992).  
Sixth, I controlled for CEO equity-based pay. I calculated CEOs’ total 
compensation as the sum of salary, bonuses, (the Black-Scholes value of) stock option 
award compensation, and the value of focal firms’ shares owned by CEOs (CEO 
ownership) (Kish-Gephard and Campbell, 2015). Next, I calculated CEOs’ equity-based 
pay by dividing (the Black-Scholes value of) stock options and the value of focal firms’ 
shares owned by CEOs (CEO ownership) by CEOs’ total compensation. 
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(4) Finally, I included year dummy and industry dummy variables to remove the 
issue of contemporaneous correlation in panel data (Certo and Semadeni, 2006) and to 
control for general macroeconomic fluctuations. These two sets of dummy variables (the 
firm’s industry and year) are included in all models but are not reported due to space 
constraints. 
Robustness Checks 
First, as many studies captured spending by using the ratio of total revenue (e.g., 
Bromiley et al., 2017), I developed an alternative measurement of CEO risk taking. After 
I collected capital expenditures, RandD spending, and long-term debt from the 
Compustat database and acquisition expenditure from SDC, I divided them by firms’ 
total revenue. I further standardized the four ratios across the whole sample to make the 
four measurements comparable with each other. Finally, I formed a risk-taking index by 
adding the four standardized values together. 
Second, I used another alternative measurement, the extent to which a firm 
focuses on exploration over exploitation, to capture CEO risk taking as a robustness 
check. Prior research has found that risk-averse decision makers prefer exploitation 
because the benefits from exploitation are more proximate, certain, and immediate 
(Lavie, Stettner, and Tushman, 2010; Lewin, Long, and Carroll, 1999; March, 1991). 
Therefore, CEOs who tend to take higher risks tend to drive firms to focus more on 
exploration rather than on exploitation. Drawing upon prior research (Kang et al., 2017; 
Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001), I first identified whether a 
firm’s patent is explorative or exploitive. A patent is an explorative patent when it was 
applied in classes for which focal firms have not historically explored (Ahuja and 
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Lampert, 2001; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001); however, it is an exploitive one when 
applied in existing classes. When a firm filed more explorative patents than exploitative 
patents at year t, I indicated that the firm has a focus on exploration over exploitation at 
that year (Kang et al., 2017; Mudambi and Swift, 2014; Swift, 2016). Following prior 
studies (Kang, 2017; Mudambi and Swift, 2014; Swift, 2016), to calculate a firm’s focus, 
I first subtracted the number of applied exploration patents from the number of applied 
exploitation patents. I then divided the results by firms’ total applied patents at that year, 
consistent with Kang (2017). 
Third, prior studies on the focus of exploration and exploitation vary in the time 
windows when they calculated the exploration/exploitation variables. For instance, Kang 
(2017) identified a patent as explorative if it was not in the classes that firms’ patents 
belonged to in the last year. Swift (2016) identified a patent as explorative if it was not in 
the classes that firms’ patents belonged to in the last three years. In my study, I not only 
followed Kang (2017) by using a 1-year time window but also created a measurement 
using 3-year time windows. 
Fourth, in the robustness checks of CEO risk taking measured by the extent to 
which a CEO focuses on exploration over exploitation, I included two more control 
variables. One is knowledge pool. Knowledge pool captures how many patents a firm 
applied for in a given year (Kang et al., 2017). I controlled for firms’ knowledge pool 
because firms with a small knowledge pool could experience huge turbulence regarding 
their focus on exploration over exploitation. The other control variable is patent-based 
diversification, measured as the entropy score based on each firm’s patent class. Highly 
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diversified firms have strong inertia (Eisenmann, 2002), which prevents inventors from 
exploring technologies in new classes. 
Fifth, following prior studies (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Zaheer, Hernandez, 
and Banerjee, 2010), I included high-tech firms in examining the role of CEO power in 
firms’ focus on exploration vs. exploitation. These high-tech firms are primarily affiliated 
with the following SIC codes: (i) in the manufacturing sector: drugs and medicines (SIC 
2833–2836), computers and office equipment (3571–3579), electrical equipment (3612–
3652), communications equipment (3661–3699), aerospace and aircraft (3721, 3724, 
3728, 3761, 3764, 3769), and measuring, photo equipment, and clocks (3821–3899); and 
(ii) in the services sector: computer programming, data processing, etc. (737X), 
engineering services (8711), and RandD and testing services (873X). 
Sixth, in the robustness checks, in which I examined the influence of CEO power 
on firms’ focus on exploration vs. exploitation, I restricted my sample to all S&P1500 
firms that were granted patents between 2001 to 2016. I restricted my sample to 
S&P1500 firms because I cannot access the CEO and board information of non-S&P1500 
firms. I limited my sample to firms with patent records because the focus on exploration 
vs. exploitation is measured using patent data. My sample ends in 2016 because the 
patent-firm information provided by Kogan et al. (2016) ends in 2016. 
Seventh, I used an alternative measure of industry complexity to do the robustness 
checks. Keats and Hitt (1988) refer to industry complexity as an index of a trend toward 
dominance by large firms in an industry over the five-year period of interest. Therefore, 
industry complexity is measured as a regression of terminal-year market shares of all 
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firms in a given industry (Yi’s) upon their shares in the initial year (Xi' s). The resulting 
regression coefficient suggests increasing or decreasing monopoly power in the industry. 
Analytical Methods 
I examined the effect of CEO power on CEO risk taking using a multiyear panel 
data analysis. The use of panel data has important advantages, though it may be prone to 
potential problems that however could be solved, such as autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation (Greene, 2003). Before I tested my 
theory, I used the Breusch-Pagan test and identified the heteroskedasticity issue in my 
panel data (p<0.001). To solve the issue, I used Huber/White correction to correct for the 
heteroskedasticity issue when testing the theory (Huber, 1967; White, 1980; 1982). 
Further, I checked whether there is an issue of first-order autocorrelation using the 
Woodridge test (Drucker, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002), and results show there is not such an 
issue. Analyses of variance inflation factors revealed that multicollinearity is not a 
problem for any models. The average of VIFs is smaller than 1.73 across models, which 
is below the typical threshold of 10 (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2013).  The highest 
VIF is 4.06, which is also below the threshold of 10. So, there is no evidence of 
multicollinearity.  
Further, fixed-effects models and random-effects models are the two sets of 
models frequently adopted for analyzing firm-year panel data. The advantage of a fixed-
effects model over a random-effects model is that the former controls for all firm-level 
characteristics, measured or unmeasured, and segregates the estimated coefficients from 
contamination from all the between-firm effects of each variable (Allison 2009; Halaby 
2004; Wooldridge 2010). However, a fixed-effects model is not able to estimate the 
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coefficients representing the between-firm effects of any variable. Further, while random-
effects models take into account both within-firm and between-firm effects, the models 
do not differentiate their respective effects.  
Compared with the fixed effects and random effects model, hybrid models have three 
major advantages (Allison, 2005; Certo et al., 2017; Schunck et al., 2013). First, the 
hybrid model tests within-firm and between-firm effects simultaneously. Second, the 
hybrid model differentiates each of the effects by displaying within-firm and between-
firm effects respectively and simultaneously. Third, a hybrid model provides the test to 
compare the within-firm and between-firm effects.  
Moreover, I theorize both the within-firm and between-firm effects of 
independent variables and moderators, and my data show that these variables have large 
portions of between-firm variances. Therefore, to correctly test my theory, it is necessary 
and important to adopt a methodology that could simultaneously test how the changes 
within firms (within-firm effects) and the changes across firms (between-firm effects) of 
independent variables and moderators influence CEO risk taking. Adopting the fixed-
effect model will waste all of the between-firm variances, leading to results with less 
statistical power (Certo et al., 2017) and preventing me from investigating how the 
changes across firms influence CEO risk taking.  
Therefore, to investigate the influence of the changes within the firms and the changes 
across the firms on CEO risk taking simultaneously, I used a hybrid model (Allison, 
2005; Certo et al., 2017; Schunck et al., 2013). Specifically, the hybrid model approach 
first splits all variables into two parts: group-centered variables and variables 
representing group means. Next, this approach uses a random-effects model to estimate 
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coefficients that represent both the within- and between-firm effects of each variable 
(Certo et al., 2017). In this approach, the group-centered variables capture only within-
group information; the group means of the variables incorporate the between-firm effects 
of the variables.  
Accordingly, I separated my independent variables, moderators, and control 
variables into two parts: group means and group-centered variables. For the interaction 
terms composed of independent variables and moderators, I followed Schunck et al.’s 
(2013) guidance, first composing the interaction terms and then separating the interaction 
terms into group means and group-centered variables. I then used random-effects models 
and included all these means and group-centered variables into the models.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and correlations of the key variables are reported in 
Appendix A. I further report the descriptive statistics and correlations of all group-
centered variables and group means in Appendix B.  
Appendix C reports the hybrid models that examine the impact of CEO power and 
nontransient investor ownership on CEO risk taking. Given approximately 70% percent 
of the variables of independent variables and moderators are from between-firm effects, I 
decide to take the most conservative approach and examine how the changes of CEO 
power and nontransient investor ownership within their firms (within-firm effects) 
influence CEO risk taking. I will compare my results derived from within-firm effects 
(the most conservative test) and between-firm effects in the discussion section. Here, I 
only report the results based on the within-firm effects, as shown in the first twenty rows 
of Table 2.  
In Hypothesis 1, I predicted that CEO power over board positively affects risk 
taking. According to Model 2 of Appendix C, CEO power over board has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on strategic risk-taking (b = .059; p < .05); this effect also 
holds for Model 4, which does not includes the CEO power-related interaction terms but 
does include nontransient investor ownership-related interaction terms. Because my 
dependent variable (CEO risk taking) is log-transformed, the magnitude of effects can be 
better understood by exponentiating the regression coefficients to obtain values that can 
be used to infer a percentage change in the outcome. I calculated that as each standard 
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deviation increases in CEO power over board, expenses on risky strategies increase by 
12.74%. Hypothesis 1 is thus supported. 
Hypothesis 2 theorized that nontransient investor ownership positively affects 
CEO risk taking. According to Model 2 of Appendix C, nontransient investor ownership 
has a positive and statistically significant effect on strategic risk-taking (b = 1.763; p 
< .001), and this effect holds across Models 2-4, which include the interaction terms 
related to nontransient investor ownership, and Model 5, which includes all interaction 
terms. 
Note that the dependent variable (CEO risk taking) is log-transformed; the 
magnitude of effects can best be understood by exponentiating the regression coefficients 
to obtain values that can be used to infer a percentage change in the outcome. I calculated 
that as each standard deviation increases in CEO power over nontransient investors, 
expenses on risky strategies increase by 30.61%. Hypothesis 2 is thus supported. 
I predicted in Hypothesis 3a that the effects of CEO power over board on CEO 
risk-taking is positively moderated by industry complexity. Model 3 of Appendix C 
shows that industry complexity is not a statistically significant moderator (b = .323; p 
= .156), and this nonsignificance is shown in Model 5. Thus, the results do not support 
Hypothesis 3a. 
Hypothesis 3b theorized that the effects of nontransient investor ownership on 
CEO risk-taking are positively moderated by industry complexity. The results are 
reported in Model 4 of Appendix C, which indicates that the moderating effects of 
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industry complexity are not statistically significant (b = -0.523; p = .447), and this 
nonsignificance is shown in Model 5. Thus, the results do not support Hypothesis 3b. 
In Hypothesis 4a, I predicted that the effects of CEO power over board on CEO 
risk-taking are positively moderated by industry dynamism. To test that idea, I included 
the relevant interaction terms in Model 3 of Appendix C. The results of this model show 
that industry munificence is not a statistically significant moderator (b = -.314; p = .181), 
and this nonsignificance is shown in Model 5. Thus, the results do not support Hypothesis 
4a. 
Hypothesis 4b theorized that the effects of nontransient investor ownership are 
positively moderated by industry dynamism. To test this idea, I included the relevant 
interaction terms in Model 4 of Appendix C. The results of this model show that industry 
munificence is not a statistically significant moderator (b = -5.698; p = .125), and this 
nonsignificance is shown in Model 5. Thus, the results do not support Hypothesis 4b. 
Hypothesis 5a theorized that the effects of CEO power over board on CEO risk-
taking are positively moderated by industry munificence. The results of this test are 
reported in Model 3 of Appendix C, which indicates that the moderating effects of 
industry munificence are not statistically significant (b = .046; p = .384), and this 
nonsignificance is shown in Model 5. Thus, the results do not support Hypothesis 5a. 
Hypothesis 5b theorized that the effects of nontransient investor ownership on 
CEO risk-taking are negatively moderated by industry munificence. The results of this 
test are reported in Model 4 of Appendix C, which indicates that the moderating effects 
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of industry munificence are not statistically significant (b = . 894; p = .321), and this 
nonsignificance is shown in Model 5. Thus, the results do not support Hypothesis 5b.  
Hypothesis 6a theorized that the effects of CEO power over board on CEO risk-
taking are positively moderated by firm slack. The results of this test are reported in 
Model 3 of Appendix C, which indicates that the moderating effects of firm slack are not 
significant (b = -.030; p =.489), and this nonsignificance is shown in Model 5. Thus, the 
results do not support Hypothesis 6a.  
Hypothesis 6b theorized that the effects of nontransient investor ownership on 
CEO risk-taking are negatively moderated by firm slack. The results of this test are 
reported in Model 4 of Appendix C, which indicates that the moderating effects of firm 
slack are statistically significant (b = 19.845; p < .1), and this significance is repeated in 
Model 5.  
A graph of this moderating effect is shown in Figure 2, allowing further 
investigation of this finding. Note that the Y-axis, CEO risk-taking, is depicted on a 
logarithmic scale and needs to be exponentiated for the proper inference of magnitude of 
effects. Specifically, one standard deviation increase in nontransient investor ownership 
is associated with a 27.33% increase in CEO risk-taking when firm slack is low (one 
standard deviation below the mean), whereas the increase is 112.01% when firm slack is 
high (one standard deviation above the mean). Hypothesis 6b is thus supported. 
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Figure 2: Moderation Effect of Firm Slack on the Relationship between Non-transient 
Investor Ownership and CEO Risk Taking  
 
Furthermore, Appendix D provides the robustness checks based on the fixed 
effects model and Appendix E provides the results based on random-effects model. As 
seen in Appendix D and E, results are consistent with my main findings.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
I theorize that CEOs with more power over boards and with high levels of 
nontransient investor ownership tend to conduct more-risky strategies. I further suggest 
that there are several boundary conditions of these baseline models, including industry 
complexity, industry dynamism, industry munificence and firm slack. My empirical 
analyses provide strong support for my two main hypotheses regarding CEO power and 
nontransient investor ownership and for CEO risk taking and on one moderation effect. 
My theory and findings further imply that employment security, the key perspective of 
my study, is an important mechanism through which CEO power and nontransient 
investor ownership affect risk taking. Given different levels of CEO power over board 
and nontransient investor ownership, CEOs differ in their levels of control of 
employment risk and thus in their risk taking.  
Theoretical Implications  
Agency theory has long assumed that CEOs are risk averse and shareholders are 
risk neutral (Hoskisson et al., 2017). Adopting agency theory, corporate governance 
studies have further suggested that powerful CEOs tend to exert their preferences and 
adopt less risky strategies (Baysinger et al., 1991; Shi et al., 2017). However, empirical 
studies provide the opposite findings regarding the relationship between CEO power and 
CEO risk taking. The mixed findings challenge the validity of the theoretical mechanism 
underlying the relationship.  
First, my theory and findings complement agency theory in explaining the effects of CEO 
power on risk taking. The agency theory logic only considers CEOs’ limited ability to 
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diversify employment risk without considering their variant abilities to control their 
existing employment risk. While all CEOs face the same limitation in terms of 
diversifying employment risk, my study suggests that it is especially important to 
consider CEOs’ different abilities to control the risk of their existing employment in 
understanding their different risk tendencies. Specifically, my theory explains why 
greater CEO power over the board grants the CEO greater control of existing 
employment and motivates the CEO to take greater risk.  
Second, this study further advances agency theory by explaining that shareholders 
differ in their risk preferences and influences over CEO risk taking. Agency theory 
assumes that shareholders have homogeneous risk preferences and tend to be more risk-
seeking than CEOs in general. However, research on shareholders shows that different 
types of shareholders tend to exhibit different risk preferences. My study theorizes how 
nontransient investor ownership may protect CEOs from the negative consequences of 
using risky strategies, increasing CEO risk taking. Specifically, with the employment 
security granted by nontransient investors, CEOs will take more-risky strategies.  
Finally, using a hybrid model to test theory provides further theoretical 
implications of within-firm and between-firm effects (Certo et al., 2017). As mentioned 
in the beginning of the results section, I chose to report the most conservative results 
based only on within-firm effects. The hybrid model not only displays within-firm effects 
but also provides between-firm effects as shown between the twenty-first and fortieth row 
of Table 2. In addition, the hybrid model compares the effects of within-firm and 
between-firm effects. This powerful statistical tool allows providing a richer 
understanding of my theory as detailed below.  
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Regarding the effects of CEO power over board on CEO risk taking (H1), Model 
2 of Table 2 shows that the coefficient based on between-firm effects is positive and 
statistically significant (b = .281; p < .001), and this effect holds for Model 2-5. In terms 
of the effects of nontransient investor ownership on CEO risk taking (H2), the coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant (b = 2.101; p < .001), and this significance holds 
for Model 2-5. These results provide strong empirical support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
These results further suggest that the effects of CEO power and nontransient investor 
ownership on CEO risk taking could explain not only within-firm changes but also 
between-firm differences.  
In addition, I tested whether the within- and between-firm effects are significantly 
different from each other.   One of the advantages of hybrid model is that it allows me to 
test the equivalence of within and between estimates (Schunck, 2013). This test is 
referred to as an augmented regression test (Jones et al. 2007, 217).The results show that 
the between-firm effects of CEO power over board are significantly stronger (p<.001) 
than are the within-firm effects, suggesting that hypothesis 1 could explain the between-
firm differences better than could within-firm variances. However, there is no significant 
difference between the between- and within-firm effects of nontransient investor 
ownership on CEO risk taking.  
Further, Hypothesis 4b theorized that the effects of nontransient investor 
ownership are positively moderated by industry dynamism. The coefficient representing 
the between-firm effects reported in Model 4 in Table 2 indicates that the moderating 
effects of industry dynamism are statistically significant (b = -24.390; p < .01), and this 
significance is repeated in Model 5. Overall, while Hypothesis 4b is not supported by the 
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results of the within-firm effects, it is supported by the results of the between-firm 
effects. In addition, the between- and the within-firm effects of many control variables 
are different from each other. For instance, the between-firm effects of return on revenue 
(p<.001), presence of female director (p<.05), CEO age (p<.1), CEO ownership (p<.001), 
firm size (p<.001) and firm diversity (p<.001) are all statistically significantly stronger 
than their within-firm effects. It is interesting to note that the within-firm effects of 
Tobin’s q (p<.05) is significantly stronger than the between-firm effects.  
Overall, all of these findings confirmed that we can hardly assume that within-
firm effects could be certainly extended to between-firm effects. As Bliese (2000) and 
Certo et al. (2017) suggested, the differences between within-firm and between-firm 
effects indicate that “scholars cannot generalize an estimate of the within-firm effect to 
the between-firm effect and vice versa”.  It is worth theorizing in future research why 
between- and within-firm effects are different from one another. In summary, the hybrid 
model provides richer understanding and further implications of my theory.  
Practical Implications  
My study offers important implications for corporate governance practices in the 
business world. Many studies suggest that constraining CEO power could prevent CEOs 
from hurting shareholder benefits (Hoskisson et al., 2017). Consequently, CEO power in 
American corporations has been consistently reduced in recent decades (Mizruchi and 
Marshall, 2016). However, this study suggests that the reduction of one standard 
deviation of CEO power over board reduces investments into risky projects by 53.1% and 
that an increase of one standard deviation of nontransient investor ownership increases 
the CEO’s investments in risky projects by 16.7%. Risky projects are one of the keys for 
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firms to gain long-term value. Therefore, this study calls for industry experts to take into 
account my findings when contemplating the level of power granted to CEOs and 
nontransient investor ownership to benefit firms in the long term.  
Limitations and Future Studies  
First, one limitation of this study is that some moderation effects do not receive 
support. I suggest that the positive effect of CEO power over board on risk taking could 
be stronger when firms are in industries with high complexity and dynamism because 
powerful CEOs could better attribute failures to other factors and take credit for 
successes. I explain that, given the challenges of running firms in these industries, 
powerful CEOs probably need more input from their boards, which often consist of 
experienced top executives. As boards are more involved in strategies in these industries, 
it may not be easier for powerful CEOs in these industries to attribute failures to other 
factors. The moderation effects of industry complexity and dynamism thus do not work.  
Further, the results do not support the moderation effects of industry munificence or firm 
slack on the positive effects of CEO power over board on CEO risk taking. I argue that 
industry munificence and firm slack offer more discretion to CEOs, who will utilize this 
discretion to take more risks. I explain that, given the greater discretion power CEOs 
possess, it will become more difficult for them to convince their boards that failures 
result from other factors out of their control.  
Moreover, the results do not support the moderation effects of industry 
complexity and dynamism on the positive effects of nontransient investor ownership on 
CEO risk taking. It is very likely that nontransient investors need to rely on the CEOs to 
turn around the firms and thus will not sell firm shares, which may dampen the expected 
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moderation effect. The results do not support the moderation effects of industry 
munificence on the positive effects of nontransient investor ownership on CEO risk 
taking. I argue that industry munificence offers more discretion to CEOs, who will utilize 
such discretion to take more risks because of the assumption that nontransient investors 
will not sell firm shares after failures of risky strategies. I explain that nontransient 
investors may sell firm shares after CEOs fail in munificent industries because 
nontransient investors have many alternative investment opportunities. Thus, CEOs may 
not have more discretion in munificent industries to take more risks.  
Second, CEO power research has been quiet for a long period. The few studies 
related to CEO power in recent years have followed the classic perspective of CEO 
power that powerful CEOs could exert their will over others (Haynes and Hillman, 2010; 
Zhu and Chen, 2015). This study adopts the perspective of employment security to 
advance our understanding of CEO power and its outcomes. I propose and found that the 
employment security is the key mechanism through which CEO power could affect CEO 
risk taking. Future research could adopt the employment security perspective to examine 
how CEO power affects firm strategies, particularly strategies associated with risks such 
as M&As, and exploration vs. exploitation, etc.  My theory suggests that CEOs with 
employment security are more likely to adopt unrelated acquisitions that are often riskier 
than related ones. Unrelated acquisitions are often risker than related ones because 
acquirers that often lack the knowledge of unrelated industries are more likely to pay 
higher premiums and the integration with firms operating in unrelated industries is much 
more challenging (Klein, 2001; Rumelt, 1982).  Hence, the employment security 
perspective can help to explain how CEOs make M&A decisions.  
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Third, relatedly, this study casts a new light on risk-taking research. I theorize that 
CEOs’ concern about employment security and control of employment risk could affect 
their risk taking. Future research could explore the factors that influence CEO 
employment security. The factors could be the new antecedents of CEO risk taking. For 
example, a board that consists of a larger portion of directors with the experience of 
dismissing CEOs or reducing CEO compensation may make the CEO of the firm feel 
threatened with being dismissed or reduced wealth (Westphal and Zajac, 1997); thus, the 
CEO is less likely to take risks.  
Conclusion 
On the basis of agency theory, corporate governance research has long proposed 
to reduce CEO power to regulate CEOs in their adoption of risky strategies (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, the findings are mixed, which challenges the theory 
underlying the relationship. To move the theory forward, this study is built upon the 
refined key construct CEO power over board and nontransient investor ownership, and it 
takes an employment security perspective to thoroughly theorize the relationship between 
CEO power and nontransient investor ownership and CEO risk taking. In addition, this 
study provides a few theoretical boundaries of the baseline relationships between CEO 
power and nontransient investor ownership and risk taking. This research offers a solid 
theoretical foundation for future research on CEO power and nontransient investor 
ownership and CEO risk taking.  
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Appendix A. Variable Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
  Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 CEO risk taking t+1 9.51 8.48 
       
2 CEO power over board 0.05 3.74 0.25 
      
3 Nontransient investor ownership -0.50 0.28 0.09 0.02 
     
4 Industry complexity 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.00 
    
5 Industry dynamism 0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.03 
   
6 Industry munificence 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
  
7 Firm slack -0.06 0.03 -0.14 -0.11 0.04 0.10 0.01 -0.03 
 
8 Equity-based pay 0.69 0.33 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.04 -0.14 -0.04 -0.02 
9 Firm size 2.32 1.28 0.35 0.30 0.01 0.12 -0.11 0.02 -0.33 
10 Diversification 1.09 0.86 0.23 0.06 0.09 -0.28 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
11 Return on assets 1.00 0.76 -0.18 -0.14 0.01 -0.06 -0.12 0.01 -0.23 
12 Tobin's Q 3.97 92.09 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
13 Financial leverage 0.99 31.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
14 Stock market beta 1.07 0.58 -0.02 -0.08 0.02 -0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.11 
15 Transient owners 0.16 0.09 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.01 
16 Presence of female director 0.03 0.17 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 
17 CEO age 57.62 7.20 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 
18 Founder CEO 0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 
19 CEO ownership 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 
 
  Variables 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
9 Firm size 0.12       
10 Diversification 0.06 0.13 
     
11 Return on assets -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 
    
12 Tobin's Q -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
   
13 Financial leverage -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.71   
14 Stock market beta 0.02 -0.16 0.22 -0.04 0.00 0.01  
15 Transient owners 0.12 -0.17 0.00 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.18 
16 Presence of female director 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03 
17 CEO age 0.10 0.13 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 
18 Founder CEO -0.02 -0.10 -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 
19 CEO ownership 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
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  Variables 15 16 17 18 
16 Presence of female director -0.04    
17 CEO age -0.04 -0.04   
18 Founder CEO 0.01 -0.02 0.07  
19 CEO ownership -0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.01 
N=11945. Correlations are significant at p<.05 if greater than .02 or less than -.02. 
  
  76 
APPENDIX B 
 
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS FOR WITHIN AND 
BETWEEN FIRM VARIABLES   
  77 
Appendix B. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for within- and between- 
Firm Variables 
 Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 CEO risk taking t+1 9.51 8.48       
2 CEO power over boards (within) 0.00 2.04 0.02      
3 Nontransient investor ownership (within) 0.00 0.15 0.04 -0.02     
4 CEO power over board (between) 0.05 3.13 0.29 0.00 0.00    
5 Nontransient investor ownership (between) 0.50 0.23 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.04   
6 Industry complexity (within) 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00  
7 Industry dynamism (within) 0.00 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
8 Industry munificent (within) 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.17 
9 Firm slack (within) 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
10 Equity-based pay (within) 0.00 0.29 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.16 
11 Firm size (within) 0.00 0.25 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 
12 Diversification (within) 0.00 0.32 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
13 Return on assets (within) 0.00 0.22 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.04 
14 Tobin's Q (within) 0.00 74.32 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 Financial leverage (within) 0.00 29.86 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 Stock market beta (within) 0.00 0.38 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17 Transient owners (within) 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.06 
18 Presence of female director (within) 0.00 0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.05 
19 CEO age (within) 0.00 4.45 0.01 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.07 
20 Founder CEO (within) 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
21 CEO ownership (within) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 
22 Industry complexity (between) 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.00 
23 Industry dynamism (between) 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 -0.03 0.00 
24 Industry munificence (between) 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.07 0.00 
25 Firm slack (between) -0.06 0.03 -0.16 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.06 0.00 
26 Equity-based pay (between) 0.69 0.16 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.17 0.00 
27 Firm size (between) 2.32 1.26 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.35 -0.01 0.00 
28 Diversification (between) 1.09 0.80 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.00 
29 Return on assets (between) 1.00 0.73 -0.19 0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.03 0.00 
30 Tobin's Q (between) 3.97 54.39 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
31 Financial leverage (between) 0.99 9.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
32 Stock market beta (between) 1.07 0.44 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.05 0.00 
33 Transient owners (between) 0.16 0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.16 0.00 
34 Presence of female director 0.03 0.13 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.11 0.00 
35 CEO age (between) 57.62 5.66 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 -0.01 0.00 
36 Founder CEO (between) 0.01 0.10 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
37 CEO ownership (between) 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.00 
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 Variables 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
8 Industry munificence (within) -0.06          
9 Firm slack (within) 0.03 -0.02         
10 Equity-based pay (within) -0.14 -0.04 -0.04        
11 Firm size (within) -0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.15       
12 Diversification (within) 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.20      
13 Return on assets (within) 0.03 0.16 -0.15 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02     
14 Tobin's Q (within) 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01    
15 Financial leverage (within) -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.77   
16 stock market beta (within) 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00  
17 Transient owners (within) -0.08 0.00 0.02 0.14 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
18 Presence of female director (within) -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19 CEO age (within) -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.18 0.10 0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 Founder CEO (within) 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 
21 CEO ownership (within) -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22 Industry complexity (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
23 Industry dynamism (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24 Industry munificent (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25 Firm slack (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
26 Equity-based pay (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27 Firm size (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
28 Diversification (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
29 Return on assets (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
30 Tobin's Q (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31 Financial leverage (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
32 Stock market beta (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
33 Transient owners (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
34 Presence of female director 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
35 CEO age (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
36 Founder CEO (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
37 CEO ownership (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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 Variables 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
18 Presence of female director (within) 0.01          
19 CEO age (within) 0.04 -0.07         
20 Founder CEO (within) -0.01 -0.01 0.03        
21 CEO ownership (within) 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01       
22 Industry complexity (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      
23 Industry dynamism (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08     
24 Industry munificent (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02    
25 Firm slack (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.04   
26 Equity based pay (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.14 -0.04 0.00  
27 Firm size (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.17 0.03 -0.37 0.21 
28 Diversification (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.33 -0.11 -0.09 -0.03 0.11 
29 Return on assets (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.25 -0.06 -0.25 -0.12 
30 Tobin's Q (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
31 Financial leverage (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
32 stock market beta (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.05 -0.05 0.17 0.03 
33 Transient owners (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.09 
34 Presence of female director 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 
35 CEO age (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 
36 Founder CEO (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.02 
37 CEO ownership (between) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02 
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 Variable 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
28 Diversification (between) 0.11        
29 Return on assets (between) 0.23 -0.09       
30 Tobin's Q (between) -0.02 0.00 -0.01      
31 Financial leverage (between) -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.67     
32 stock market beta (between) -0.11 0.31 -0.05 0.00 0.04    
33 Transient owners (between) -0.13 0.02 0.13 -0.02 0.03 0.30   
34 Presence of female director 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.07  
35 CEO age (between) 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.10 -0.02 
36 Founder CEO (between) -0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.03 
37 CEO ownership (between) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 
 
 Variables 35 36 
36 Founder CEO (between) 0.09  
37 CEO ownership (between) 0.06 0.02 
N=11945. Correlations are significant at p<.05 if greater than .02 or less than -.02. 
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Appendix C: Regression Results Based on Hybrid Model  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO power over board (within)  0.059** 0.054 0.058** 0.047 
  (0.042) (0.263) (0.043) (0.293) 
Nontransient investor ownership  1.763*** 1.743*** 3.277*** 3.273*** 
    (within)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO power over board    0.323  0.334 
    X Industry complexity (within)   (0.156)  (0.150) 
CEO power over board    -0.314  -0.313 
    X Industry dynamism (within)   (0.181)  (0.183) 
CEO power over board    0.046  0.033 
    X Industry munificence (within)   (0.384)  (0.415) 
CEO power over board    -0.030  -0.145 
    X Firm slack (within)   (0.489)  (0.455) 
Nontransient investor ownership     -0.523 -0.885 
    X Industry complexity (within)    (0.447) (0.410) 
Nontransient investor ownership     -5.698 -6.000 
    X Industry dynamism (within)    (0.125) (0.110) 
Nontransient investor ownership     0.894 0.952 
    X Industry munificence (within)    (0.321) (0.310) 
Nontransient investor ownership     19.845* 19.659* 
    X Firm slack (within)    (0.075) (0.076) 
CEO power over board (between)  0.286*** 0.399** 0.277*** 0.364** 
  (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.016) 
Nontransient investor ownership  2.090*** 2.054*** 2.543* 2.644* 
    (between)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.030) 
CEO power over board    1.539*  1.344 
    X Industry complexity (between)   (0.072)  (0.106) 
CEO power over board    0.047  0.070 
    X Industry dynamism (between)   (0.471)  (0.455) 
CEO power over board    -0.676  -0.589 
    X Industry munificence (between)   (0.160)  (0.193) 
CEO power over board    1.716  1.337 
    X Firm slack (between)   (0.179)  (0.233) 
Nontransient investor ownership     38.655*** 34.802*** 
    X Industry complexity (between)    (0.003) (0.008) 
Nontransient investor ownership     -24.239** -24.255** 
    X Industry dynamism (between)    (0.010) (0.010) 
Nontransient investor ownership     -17.594** -17.377** 
    X Industry munificence (between)    (0.013) (0.014) 
Nontransient investor ownership     -12.583 -13.138 
    X Firm slack (between)    (0.170) (0.165) 
Industry munificence (within) 4.508*** 4.536*** 4.459*** 4.783** 4.879** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.037) (0.033) 
Industry complexity (within) -1.050 -1.357 -1.331 1.510 1.688 
 (0.604) (0.499) (0.505) (0.650) (0.607) 
Industry dynamism (within) -0.792 -0.690 -0.723 -1.061 -1.111 
 (0.286) (0.350) (0.321) (0.269) (0.245) 
Firm slack (within) 4.367 4.400 4.480 -4.528 -4.491 
 (0.368) (0.364) (0.379) (0.539) (0.551) 
Equity based pay (within) 0.487* 0.403 0.399 0.412 0.410 
 (0.082) (0.147) (0.151) (0.137) (0.140) 
Firm size (within) 0.602** 0.538* 0.547* 0.545* 0.553* 
 (0.050) (0.072) (0.067) (0.067) (0.063) 
Diversification (within) 0.418** 0.404** 0.405** 0.393** 0.394** 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.040) (0.046) (0.046) 
Return on assets (within) 0.032 0.125 0.122 0.116 0.114 
 (0.907) (0.649) (0.657) (0.671) (0.677) 
Tobin's Q (within) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
  83 
Financial leverage (within) -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.038) (0.038) 
stock market beta (within) -0.254 -0.240 -0.231 -0.231 -0.222 
 (0.123) (0.145) (0.159) (0.158) (0.174) 
Transient owners (within) 0.184 1.094 1.082 1.182 1.167 
 (0.840) (0.243) (0.249) (0.210) (0.217) 
Presence of female director (within) -0.394 -0.478 -0.458 -0.440 -0.419 
 (0.364) (0.270) (0.293) (0.311) (0.337) 
CEO age (within) 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.769) (0.932) (0.955) (0.913) (0.934) 
Founder CEO (within) -0.776 -1.005 -1.007 -0.986 -0.987 
 (0.449) (0.321) (0.319) (0.328) (0.326) 
CEO ownership (within) -3.475 -3.996 -3.611 -3.680 -3.272 
 (0.314) (0.240) (0.286) (0.278) (0.333) 
Industry munificent (between) 2.932 4.881 6.206 -16.199** -13.109 
 (0.522) (0.271) (0.185) (0.044) (0.129) 
Industry complexity (between) 2.139 2.362 1.848 14.267*** 13.796** 
 (0.327) (0.268) (0.378) (0.009) (0.011) 
Industry dynamism (between) 1.360 -0.711 -0.445 9.014* 9.104* 
 (0.656) (0.816) (0.883) (0.064) (0.060) 
Firm slack (between) -24.017*** -23.729*** -22.537*** -19.107*** -17.925*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
Equity based pay (between) 4.848*** 3.702*** 3.718*** 3.780*** 3.792*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size (between) 2.265*** 2.023*** 2.021*** 2.039*** 2.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification (between) 1.884*** 1.791*** 1.784*** 1.789*** 1.781*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return on assets (between) -3.033*** -2.815*** -2.803*** -2.806*** -2.795*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q (between) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.244) (0.273) (0.276) (0.438) (0.435) 
Financial leverage (between) 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.537) (0.532) (0.516) (0.506) (0.498) 
stock market beta (between) -0.946*** -0.770** -0.773** -0.748** -0.748** 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) 
Transient owners (between) 2.964 2.980 2.791 3.150 2.978 
 (0.184) (0.173) (0.200) (0.150) (0.172) 
Presence of female director (between) -2.362*** -2.169*** -2.165*** -2.080*** -2.061*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
CEO age (between) -0.041* -0.056** -0.055** -0.057** -0.056** 
 (0.078) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) 
Founder CEO (between) -2.301 -2.332 -2.357 -2.211 -2.235 
 (0.122) (0.113) (0.107) (0.133) (0.127) 
CEO ownership (between) -122.795*** -120.357*** -123.742*** -106.914*** -111.032*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 4.714** 5.509*** 5.388*** 4.944** 4.758** 
 (0.020) (0.006) (0.008) (0.017) (0.023) 
Chi2 1008.42 1203.98 1218.78 1282.09 1297.35 
N=11945. The z-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects and two-tailed for control 
variables. Year dummies are included but not reported for space concern. 
*p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Appendix D: Regression Results Based on Fixed-effect Model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO power over board  0.059* 0.054 0.058** 0.047 
  (0.041) (0.263) (0.043) (0.293) 
Nontransient investor ownership  1.763*** 1.743*** 3.277*** 3.273*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO power over board    -0.314  -0.313 
     X Industry complexity   (0.181)  (0.183) 
CEO power over board    0.046  0.033 
    X Industry dynamism   (0.384)  (0.415) 
CEO power over board    0.323  0.334 
    X Industry munificence   (0.155)  (0.150) 
CEO power over board    -0.030  -0.145 
    X Firm slack   (0.489)  (0.499) 
Nontransient investor ownership     -5.698 -6.000 
    X Industry complexity    (0.125) (0.109) 
Nontransient investor ownership     0.894 0.952 
    X Industry dynamism    (0.321) (0.309) 
Nontransient investor ownership     -0.523 -0.885 
    X Industry munificence    (0.447) (0.410) 
Nontransient investor ownership      19.845* 19.659* 
    X Firm slack    (0.075) (0.076) 
Industry complexity -1.050 -1.357 -1.331 1.510 1.688 
 (0.603) (0.498) (0.504) (0.650) (0.607) 
Industry dynamism -0.792 -0.690 -0.723 -1.061 -1.111 
 (0.285) (0.350) (0.320) (0.268) (0.245) 
Industry munificence 4.508*** 4.536*** 4.459*** 4.783** 4.879** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.037) (0.033) 
Firm slack 4.367 4.400 4.480 -4.528 -4.491 
 (0.367) (0.363) (0.378) (0.538) (0.550) 
Equity-based pay 0.487* 0.403 0.399 0.412 0.410 
 (0.082) (0.146) (0.150) (0.137) (0.139) 
Firm size 0.602** 0.538* 0.547* 0.545* 0.553* 
 (0.050) (0.072) (0.067) (0.067) (0.062) 
Diversification 0.418** 0.404** 0.405** 0.393** 0.394** 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.040) (0.046) (0.045) 
Return on assets 0.032 0.125 0.122 0.116 0.114 
 (0.907) (0.649) (0.657) (0.671) (0.677) 
Tobin's Q 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
Financial leverage -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.038) (0.038) 
Stock market beta -0.254 -0.240 -0.231 -0.231 -0.222 
 (0.123) (0.145) (0.158) (0.158) (0.174) 
Transient owners 0.184 1.094 1.082 1.182 1.167 
 (0.840) (0.243) (0.248) (0.210) (0.217) 
Presence of female director -0.394 -0.478 -0.458 -0.440 -0.419 
 (0.363) (0.270) (0.293) (0.310) (0.336) 
CEO age 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.768) (0.932) (0.955) (0.912) (0.934) 
Founder CEO -0.776 -1.005 -1.007 -0.986 -0.987 
 (0.449) (0.321) (0.319) (0.328) (0.325) 
CEO ownership -3.475 -3.996 -3.611 -3.680 -3.272 
 (0.313) (0.239) (0.286) (0.278) (0.333) 
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Constant 6.980*** 6.533*** 6.505*** 5.827*** 5.780*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F 5.17 5.26 4.69 4.74 4.30 
N=11945. The z-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects and two-tailed for control 
variables. Year dummies are included but not reported for space concern. 
*p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
  
  87 
APPENDIX E 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS BASED ON RANDOM-EFFECT MODEL 
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Appendix E: Regression Results Based on Random-effect Model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO power over board  0.145*** 0.157** 0.145*** 0.152** 
  (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.028) 
Nontransient investor ownership  1.937*** 1.929*** 3.200*** 3.207*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO power over board    -0.129  -0.133 
     X Industry complexity   (0.269)  (0.335) 
CEO power over board    -0.078  -0.086 
    X Industry dynamism   (0.305)  (0.289) 
CEO power over board    0.511*  0.516* 
    X Industry munificence   (0.050)  (0.055) 
CEO power over board    0.298  0.205 
    X Firm slack   (0.382)  (0.419) 
Nontransient investor ownership     -6.684 -6.948 
    X Industry complexity    (0.071) (0.062) 
Nontransient investor ownership     0.305 0.471 
    X Industry dynamism    (0.437) (0.403) 
Nontransient investor ownership     1.345 0.749 
    X Industry munificent    (0.362) (0.422) 
Nontransient investor ownership     15.678* 15.559* 
    X Firm slack    (0.088) (0.091) 
Industry complexity -0.550 -0.599 -0.612 2.721 2.843 
 (0.719) (0.693) (0.692) (0.293) (0.271) 
Industry dynamism -0.116 -0.067 -0.006 -0.155 -0.165 
 (0.869) (0.924) (0.993) (0.872) (0.863) 
Industry munificence 5.330*** 5.431*** 5.366*** 4.742** 4.966** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.028) 
Firm slack -8.062** -8.188** -7.840** -15.281** -14.957** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.034) (0.012) (0.015) 
Equity based pay 0.791*** 0.600** 0.599** 0.607** 0.607** 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) 
Firm size 2.055*** 1.942*** 1.946*** 1.956*** 1.960*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification 1.057*** 1.027*** 1.027*** 1.022*** 1.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return on assets -1.977*** -1.894*** -1.896*** -1.894*** -1.895*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.219) (0.152) (0.151) (0.164) (0.164) 
Financial leverage -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.145) (0.112) (0.112) (0.116) (0.117) 
Stock market beta -0.269* -0.252* -0.246* -0.254* -0.246* 
 (0.065) (0.080) (0.088) (0.079) (0.087) 
Transient owners 0.946 1.699** 1.705** 1.774** 1.774** 
 (0.273) (0.049) (0.048) (0.040) (0.040) 
Presence of female director -0.793** -0.824** -0.819** -0.797** -0.790** 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.042) 
CEO age -0.013 -0.026** -0.026* -0.026** -0.026** 
 (0.308) (0.049) (0.050) (0.045) (0.046) 
Founder CEO -1.370 -1.771** -1.793** -1.782** -1.803** 
 (0.122) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) 
CEO ownership -18.044*** -18.421** -18.191** -18.354*** -18.117*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
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Constant 4.916*** 4.983*** 4.979*** 4.379*** 4.357*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
chi2 545.47 634.04 636.50 648.35 652.33 
N=11945. The z-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects and two-tailed for control 
variables. Year dummies are included but not reported for space concern. 
*p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
